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Tiivistelmä – Abstract 
 
Tämä yleisen historian pro gradu – työ käsittelee Kyproksen kriisin YK-
kirjeenvaihtoa vuonna 1964 historiapolitiikan näkökulmasta. Historiapolitiikalla 
tutkimuksella viitataan historian tietoiseen käyttöön politiikan välineenä. Pro gradu 
-työn teoreettisena viitekehyksenä on suurimmalta osalta Pilvi Torstin (2008) 
esittämä jaottelu, jossa historiapolitiikan käyttöä voidaan tutkia sen 
ilmenemismuotojen tai poliittisten motiivien kautta. Tälle tutkimukselle oleellisia 
historiapolitiikan ilmenemismuotoja ovat historian käyttö juridisina argumentteina 
sekä julkisissa lausunnoissa.  Tutkimus tunnistaa myös Torstin jaottelun mukaiset 
sisä- ja ulkopoliittiset sekä ’yleisen hyvän’ motiivit Kyproksen edustajien historiaan 
viittaavassa argumentoinnissa.  
Tutkielma lähestyy aihetta lähdeaineiston kriittisellä analyysilla ja 
tulkinnalla. Vastikään itsenäistynyt Kypros ajautui sisäpoliittiseen kriisiin ja 
väkivaltaisiin yhteenottoihin saaren kreikkalaisen ja turkkilaisen yhteisön välillä 
joulukuussa 1963. Kyproksen kriisi otettiin YK:n turvallisuusneuvoston agendalle 
alkuvuodesta 1964 ja Kyproksen yhteisöjen edustajat olivat tiuhaan yhteydessä 
turvallisuusneuvostoon sekä YK:n pääsihteeriin. Tutkimus analysoi näiden 
kirjeiden historiallisten argumenttien käyttöä ja niiden sisäänrakennettuja 
nationalistisia olettamuksia. Kriisin kaksi osapuolta luovat kahta hyvin erilaista 
kertomusta siitä, mitä saarella tapahtuu ja mikä on väkivallan taustalla. Vaikka kriisi 
on sama, narratiivit vaihtelevat suuresti. 
 Analyysi tunnistaa historia-argumenttien poliittisen käytön Kyproksen 
kriisin osapuolten viestinnässä. Se myös huomioi, että nationalistiset rakenteet, 
kuten omaksutut historiakäsitykset, kansakunnan kohtalo ja viholliskäsitykset ovat 
usein tautalla historian poliittisessa käytössä, erityisesti kun kyseessä on Kyproksen 
kriisin kaltainen pitkittynyt etnisten ryhmien välinen konflikti. Kyproksen kriisin 
osapuolten yhteydenpito YK:n turvallisuusneuvostolle oli valjastettu omien 
poliittisten tavoitteiden edistämiseksi, ei niinkään avoimen ja rakentavan dialogin 
aikaansaamiseksi. Historiapolitiikan viitekehyksen soveltaminen antaa 
tutkimukselle syvyyttä kun pyritään ymmärtämään, mikä motivoi osapuolia 
käyttämään juuri kyseessä olevia historiallisia argumentteja.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF HISTORY IN THE CYPRIOT DISPUTE 
 
‘The recent events in Cyprus are indeed most regrettable. Particularly as the destiny of 
this island had been, and is, that of a bridge to unity and not of a focus of friction and 
violence to which the Turkish partition policy has brought to it. The obvious cause and 
the instrument of inter-communal trouble should be eliminated if peace is to return to 
the island and co-operation among the various sections of its people be resumed.’  
 
‘To the Greeks of Cyprus Greece is their glorious motherland and for attaining the 
union of Cyprus with their motherland they are entitled to abuse the good offices of the 
United Nations, to deny the effect of treaties they solemnly signed, to attack the very 
foundation of the independence for which they pretend to be concerned and to attack 
and kill all Turks who denounce Union of Cyprus with Greece.’  1   
 
The above quotations are from the letters of the representatives of Greek Cypriots 
and the Turkish Cypriots to the United Nations Security Council in 1964. Just by 
reading the statements, an outsider observer would have a hard time to understand 
that the two representatives are talking about the same crisis. How can the 
representatives’ explanations of the same dispute be so contradicting, as if they 
were experiencing two different incidents? Why the act of fulfilling the historical 
destiny of the island appears as terror and oppression to another?  
 
An interesting approach arises when we seek to understand the sense and use of 
history behind the arguments, rather than taking the statements at face value and 
debating over their truthfulness. Historical experiences are rooted in individual 
experiences.  The sense of historicalness is an essential political device to position 
the state towards other societies.  In a time of change or crisis, history’s role as an 
amplifier or an authority to the present day may become emphasized. Emphasizing 
history’s continuity or discontinuity towards the present day is an effective way to 
                                                        
1 Letter from the permanent representative of Cyprus to the Security Council. S/5566. 27 February 
1964. & A response to the earlier from the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber of Cyprus to 
the Security Council. S/5580. 5 March 1964.  
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influence public opinion and defend political actions. Understanding the role of 
history is crucial when we want to win to peace, rather than just the war. 2   
 
Our individual identity is intertwined with the sense of personal history and built 
on past experiences. We use our own historical experiences when we navigate in 
social life. Radical experiences or personal crises can challenge the idea we had 
about our individual history and we start to negotiate between what we consider to 
be the truth and what the others consider to be true. If we take a step further and 
move from the personal experiences to examine the political life, it is easy to notice 
when there is an intentional act3 of employing history for political agenda or when 
historical paradigms are challenged for the sake of political objectives. In academic 
studies this phenomenon is called the politics of history.  This master’s thesis can be 
placed in the field of politics of history studies4, which is set to explore the political 
use of history. The roots of in studying the use of history derives from the 
Historikerstreit in the 1980s Germany, when the leading German historians and 
intelligentsia argued about the connectedness and continuum between the present 
day Germany and Hitler’s Germany. 5  
 
Researchers interested in the politics of history could immerse into various 
phenomena in the modern European history. There is the legacy of the Second 
World War and the Holocaust studies, the reparations politics in Germany, the 
Yugoslav Wars and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, this master’s thesis 
looks at the far most Mediterranean corner of Europe and focuses on the Cyprus 
dispute. The thesis examines the political use of history in the country’s inter-
communal crisis in 1964.  
 
                                                        
2 Keane, John. 1988. in Aunesluoma, Juhana & Torsti, Pilvi. 2009. Historian käyttö yhteiskunnassa ja 
tutkimuksessa. 276. 
3 Intentionality is the crucial point. The thesis acknowledges that there are various ways in which 
historical narratives and perceptions can affect our behavior subconsciously. However, the 
presumption is that a seasoned political player, who speaks in behalf of a crisis state in an 
international platform such as the UN Security Council, is well aware of his own motives and the 
choice of words. This assumption is a precondition for the analysis.   
4 See for example: Aunesluoma & Torsti. 2009., Tilli, Jouni. 2009. Tiloja, linjauksia ja retoriikkaa – 
historiapolitiikan linjauksia., Torsti, Pilvi. 2008. Historiapolitiikkaa tutkimaan.  
5 Aunesluoma & Torsti. 2009. 276.  
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The young republic of Cyprus declined into division in the 20th century when its 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities drifted towards radical nationalism 
in their quest for unification with their respective homelands. The year 1964 
marked the beginning of the division of the island, culminating in the physical 
partition when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and divided it in into the Turkish 
and Greek sectors. That division still exists today and the island of Cyprus consists 
of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
 
In 2015, the division of Cyprus and the problematic status of the politically isolated 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) continue to be subjects to 
international mediation efforts.  The United Nations has been engaged in Cyprus 
ever since 1964 when the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 
was established.  The peace keeping force was initially created as a temporary tool 
to maintain peace and monitor cease-fire until a final solution was reached. It is 
revealing that the UNFICYP has not been able to leave Cyprus since. The latest and 
perhaps the most noteworthy attempt to bring solution to the situation was the 
Annan Plan for Cyprus, initiated by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
which proposed restructuring the divided island into a federal state. However, the 
Greek Cypriot community rejected the plan in a referendum in 2004. 6   
 
There are a couple of dates in history, which can be considered as key moments in 
the crisis. Much of scholarly attention has been given to the year 1974 when Turkey 
invaded the island and sealed the division of the island. However, this study is 
interested in the earlier events of 1964, when the violence and atrocities escalated 
and brought the island to the brink of civil war. In 1964 the Turkish Cypriot 
community also resigned from the Cypriote government and the dispute was placed 
in the Security Council’s agenda. Much of what happened that year had an impact on 
the future of the island and the engagement of the UN.  The thesis will cover the 
considerations and arguments of that decisive year.  
 
                                                        
6 For more information about the Annan Plan and the reunification process see for example 
Faustmann, H. & Varnava, A. (eds.) 2009. Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond.  
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Both Cypriot communities appealed extensively to the United Nations Security 
Council in 1964. The thesis analyses this correspondence and looks for the politics 
of history in their argumentation and rhetoric. By deploying the framework of the 
politics of history, the thesis analyzes which topics and narratives were popular in 
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot argumentation in 1964. Nationalism and 
politics of history are intertwined phenomenon, especially when there is a crisis 
between two competing ethnic groups. Because nationalism was an important 
factor in the Cypriot crisis, the thesis also addresses the nationalist references in the 
representatives’ letters and includes them into the analysis. 
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1.1 The scope and structure of the study 
 
The study is structured as follows: the introduction addresses the previous studies, 
sources and secondary literary, explains the main research questions and offers 
some theoretical and methodological considerations. The second chapter 
introduces the history of Cyprus pre 1964, the culmination of the violence and the 
timeline of the events in 1964, as well as the main actors of the 1964 negotiations. 
The Greek, Turkish and British governments were all major players in the crisis and 
the thesis gives background information of where they stood in the dispute.  It is 
also necessary to remember the Cold War tensions in order to understand the world 
politics at that time. The third and fourth chapters offer the analysis. The chapters 
are divided into subchapters according to the main themes deployed in the Cypriot 
representatives’ argumentation. The analysis also seeks to identify the main 
nationalist constructions from the correspondence. The analysis also tests how well 
the theoretical framework of politics of history works for analyzing these types of 
documents and correspondence. The final chapter returns to the research questions 
and offers some observations and conclusions drawn from the analysis.  
  
Due the complex nature of the Cypriot dispute, there are many aspects which had to 
be left out of this thesis. Firstly, the temporal focus of the study is only the year 1964, 
even though it would be interesting to conduct a comparative study to analyze the 
development of the argumentation in the following years, leading to 1974 when 
Turkey invaded Northern Cyprus.  Secondly, the thesis has the capacity to address 
the Cold War politics only very generally, even though it was an important factor in 
the handling of the crisis in the UN.  
 
In addition, the available source material is limited mostly to the written arguments, 
the only exception being the records of the statements made in the Security Council 
Meetings during 1964. The thesis acknowledges that the letters and public 
statements sent to the UN Security Council offer more formal and polished material 
than the informal and private discussions would. However, the official 
correspondence cannot be considered one-dimensional, either. The 1964 letters 
and statements were directed to Security Council in order to influence the 
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international community’s opinion. Behind their formality and diplomatic courtesy, 
they are just as revealing as any propaganda publication. Besides, it has been argued 
that texts develop properties and meaning only in the function of circumstances in 
which they are encountered.7 Herein lays the interest of the research.  
 
When we analyze letters directed towards the Security Council, it must be kept in 
mind that even though the Security Council is a political body, not a juridical one, it 
can sometimes act in a ‘quasi-juridical’ mode. That shapes the style of 
argumentation in the Security Council. Often the representatives in the Security 
Council employ ‘strategic argumentation’ in which arguments are used to reinforce 
positions and to change others opinions. It is also argued that the impartial 
arguments and appeals to collective interests fare better in the Security Council, 
even if they were used insincerely. ‘The civilizing force of hypocrisy’ may lead to 
‘argumentative self-entrapment’: when a country accepts a norm rhetorically it is 
forced to make concessions to the general interests and conceal its self-interest.  In 
addition, the Security Council enjoys a certain level of respect among the Member 
States and the reputations in the Council matter. 8  
 
Even though the study refers to the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots as 
unanimous actors, it does not presume that either one of them is, or ever was, a 
homogenous group with no internal fractions or conflicting opinions. Their 
representatives certainly did not represent all Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots. 
However, the certain Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives were 
chosen to represent their community in the UN: it is reasonable to consider that at 
least most of their opinions and arguments reflect those of their respective 
communities.  
 
The thesis sets out to answer the following research questions: What kind of history 
of the Cyprus dispute is narrated to the Security Council by the conflict States? Did the 
representatives’ nationalist history perceptions affect their statements? What methods 
and motives of politics of history can be detected from the correspondence? 
                                                        
7 Johnstone, Ian. 2003. Security Council deliberations: The power of the better argument. 444-445.  
8 Ibid. 452, 454, 477. 
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It has been argued, that even though the way a group chooses to define itself is a 
psychological fact, national identity can be subjected to negotiation if it affects other 
groups or entities. Even though a group cannot negotiate the way it feels, they can 
change how they externalize their national identity within political discourse. 9 
Understanding this process of nationalist identity construction is also crucial to a 
politics of history thesis. 
 
  
                                                        
9  Kelman, Herbert C. 1997. Negotiating National Identity and Self-Determination in Ethnic Conflicts. 
336-337. 
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1.1 Sources, literature and previous studies 
 
The thesis analyses the correspondence and statements of the Cypriot 
representatives in the UN Security Council in 1964. The sources include letters, 
faxes, telegrams and Security Council statements from the young republic that was 
declining into chaos and inter-communal violence. Both the Greek Cypriots and the 
Turkish Cypriots offered different explanations about the atrocities and illegalities 
in the island. Both sides were quick to blame the other side for unprovoked violence 
and for the mistreatment of civilians. Because the coverage is so extensive – in fact, 
it seems like every minor violation was reported to the Security Council – to find 
two versions of the same incident is a rule rather than an exception.  
 
In 1964 the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations received more than 180 letters and documents concerning the 
situation in Cyprus. Most of these letters came from the representatives of the 
Cypriot communities, but there is also a noteworthy amount of correspondence 
from Turkey and some from Greece. The thesis includes their argumentation to the 
analysis because the governments in Ankara and Athens were believed to support, 
respectively, the objectives of the Turkish Cypriots or the Greek Cypriots in the 
dispute. While these letters represent highly subjective, or even biased, assessments 
of the issue, the official reports from the Secretary General or the UNFICYP 
commander to the Security Council concerning Cyprus represent a more objective 
outlook. The neutral opinions and arguments reveal what was considered to be the 
impartial position in the dispute.  
 
The correspondence is digitalized and available online at the UN Documents 
archives.10 Every document has a bullet symbol (e.g. S/5622) with which they are 
cited in the thesis.11 The language of the documents is English, unless mentioned 
otherwise. It is duly noted that certain aspects of argumentation can suffer when the 
representatives are not using their mother tongue – in this case Turkish or Greek. 
                                                        
10 The United Nations Publications: Documents. http://www.un.org/en/documents/.  
11 For an example of the letters see Appendix 1. Letter from the permanent representative of Cyprus 
to the President of the Security Council. 24 March 1964. S/5622. 
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However, because the spokespersons in question have written the correspondence 
originally in English, it is safe to assume that no major aspects of argumentation 
have been lost in translation. In addition, because the common language in the 
House of Representative in Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek members at that 
time was English12, it is safe to assume that most of the representatives were used 
to presenting their agenda in English.   
 
Because the primary sources are highly subjective, the research has to emphasize 
the secondary research literature. The analysis can be credibly conducted only with 
a comprehensive information about the crisis. There is an extensive amount of 
literature concerning the Cyprus dispute. It is a subject that attracts heated 
statements and very opinionated publications, and the interpretations of the events 
in 1964 vary greatly. Therefore it is crucial that the thesis deploys multiple different 
studies and articles just to find the middle ground. There are a couple of scholarly 
studies, which are particularly substantial for this aim.   
 
Firstly, Salahi R. Sonyel’s Cyprus – The destruction of a republic and its aftermath. 
British documents 1960 – 197413 is a valuable addition to the research literature. A 
Turkish Cypriot, Sonyel received his education in the Great Britain and has 
published many books and studies concerning the Cypriot dispute. His affiliations 
are within the Turkish Cypriot community. Despite its subjective nature, the value 
of Sonyel’s publication is in its comprehensive collection of the British authorities’ 
documents. Because of the old colonial status of Cyprus and British military bases 
on the island, the British were up to their necks involved in the dispute. A violent 
intercommunal crisis in former British colonial country was quite embarrassing for 
the Commonwealth, especially when the Great Britain had been one of the main 
designers of the structure of the independent Cyprus. Consequently, the British 
government monitored the situation carefully. Sonyel’s book offers a good coverage 
of these documents from the British National Archives. 
 
                                                        
12 Stephens, Robert. 1966. Cyprus: A place of arms.  173.  
13 Sonyel, Salahi R. 2003. Cyprus – The destruction of republic and its aftermath. British documents 
1960 – 1974.  
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Another important addition to the research literature is a former British diplomat 
William Mallinson’s A Modern history of Cyprus14, which is essentially the history of 
the British diplomatic relations in Cyprus.  The study goes laudably in details about 
the personal relations and diplomatic efforts behind the Cypriot question. The 
primary source material itself does not offer any hints about this side of the UN 
correspondence; therefore it is especially important to gather that information from 
the research literature.  
 
Various other international scholars have also written scholarly articles and 
publications about the situation in Cyprus, which have added substance to the 
research. In addition to the studies and research concerning Cyprus, the thesis also 
deploys studies and articles about the politics of history and identity negotiations as 
well as studies about the UN diplomacy and argumentation. It is also important to 
understand the construction of nationalist argumentation and the complex nature 
of an ethnonational identity.  
 
There is a wide selection of master’s theses concerning Cyprus. To mention some, 
Laura Paloheimo’s political history thesis Yksi saari – kaksi historiaa: Menneisyys 
sovun esteenä Kyprosessa (2008) examines the present day Cyprus and how the 
turbulent history still divides the island; Inan Sacat’s political science thesis 
Perceptions of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot of the Cyprus Problem Then and 
Now: A study of contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism (2001) 
concentrates on the nationalism aspect in the contemporary Cypriot society.  
However, both of the theses have different temporal and theoretical settings 
compared to this research. Many of the recent master’s theses about Cyprus deal 
with its accession to the EU and are thus less relevant to this particular research. 
The master’s theses about history politics are even greater in number: particularly 
Vesa Salminen’s political science thesis Diplomatian historiapolitiikka: Historia-
argumenttien käyttö Kosovon kysymyksessä 1998-2010 (2011) has been a substantial 
addition to the research literature. 
  
  
                                                        
14 Mallinson, William. 2005. A modern history of Cyprus. 
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1.3 Politics of history and theoretical considerations  
 
The thesis deploys qualitative content analysis, or: historical method, where the 
issue is approached by the critical examination and comparison of the primary 
sources. Source criticism is one of the main methodological tools for this type of 
analysis. The thesis also adds the politics of history perspective into the source 
interpretation.  The politics of history can be set apart from the everyday history, 
or; historicalness, because it employs conscious interpretation and intentionality. 
Politics of history use past as a device for political argumentation and creating 
narratives. Crafting narratives from the past differs from history as such, because a 
narrative requires a coherent story and a beginning and an end, which is something 
that history itself rarely possesses. 15  
 
It is quite easy for the critical reader to notice when history is used politically, but it 
is not as easy to define how to examine it empirically. That is why the next two 
subchapters will address the theory and framework of politics of history as 
presented by Pilvi Torsti in 2008, with additional observations from John Torpey in 
2003 and Alexander Wendt in 1999.  
 
Manifestations of the politics of history 
 
According to Pilvi Torsti the manifestations of political use of history can be divided 
into six categories: history education, historical references in culture (i.e. 
memorials, museums, street names etc.), juridical decisions, public speeches and 
comments, history publications, and scholarly history research.16 The thesis will 
focus mainly on the politics of history in the juridical decisions and in public 
speeches and comments. Some of the other categories have already been addressed 
in previous scholarly publications, see for example the politics of history education 
in Cyprus.17 
 
                                                        
15 Tilli. 2009. 280, 281, 286.  
16 Torsti. 2008. 62. 
17 See Papadakis (2006) and Bryant & Papadakis (eds.) (2012). 
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Politics of history in the level of juridical decisions means that history is used to make 
legislative amends with the past. Any public organization with a legal capacity can 
make statements about history or require reparations about alleged historical 
violations. A good example of the juridical manifestation of politics of history is the 
law against Holocaust denial in Germany, which declares the denying or 
trivialization of a part of history punishable by law. The denial legislation has also 
received criticism because it imposes ’…historical truth as legal truth, which is a 
dangerous attitude available to other fields of application.’18 
 
Other manifestations of the politics of history in the juridical level are reparation 
demands imposed on governments and reparations politics. These demands pose 
an interesting juridical question because they presume that the present day 
governments are responsible for the previous governments’ crimes or violations.  In 
other words, reparations politics require a mutual agreement by all parties involved 
that they are still somehow affected by history. There is power in the sentiment of 
continuity and connectedness with the past. Other juridical politics of history are 
public apologies or statements of regret, which apologize for historical 
wrongdoings. The gestures are symbolic in nature but they often include a wish to 
pave the way towards a negotiation stage, where the actual reparations and 
restitutions of material kind are agreed on. 19 In Cyprus, the question of history’s 
juridical status is particularly interesting and the thesis addresses it in the analysis 
part.  
 
In addition to the juridical decisions, another aspect the legislative power of history 
is the legitimacy of a government. If a community obtains and presents the status of 
a legal government, it is allowed to the monopoly of legitimate violence. 
Fundamentally, the right to legitimate violence requires that all sides have accepted 
the government’s legitimacy. In practice, however, there may be a side that contests 
or denies that right – in the Cypriot case the Turkish Cypriots never acknowledged 
the legality of the Greek Cypriot Government even though the international 
community had recognized it. Hence, the mere claim to the legitimacy can equal the 
                                                        
18 Vidal-Naquet, Pierre. 1980. A Paper Eichmann - Anatomy of a Lie. 10.  
19 Torpey, John (ed). 2003. Politics and the past. On repairing historical injustices. 93, 101. 
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practical right, until that monopoly is removed by stronger opposition. 20  This is 
relevant when we consider how the Greek Cypriot element established and 
maintained its status as the only legal government of Cyprus in 1964 and diminished 
the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements’ status to that of rebels.  
 
Another relevant manifestation of politics of history is public speeches and 
comments. These statements typically include oversimplified narratives and 
powerful slogans, which possess a certain mass appeal. The speeches and 
statements also tend to use extreme expressions such as ‘the enemy’ or ‘a traitor’. 
The present day political objectives can be explained by past events and violations. 
21 Justification is gathered from the history. Herein it is important to remember the 
matter of choice: every speech and comment harnessed from history for political 
purposes presumes a conscious choice of narrative. The speaker always chooses 
between not one but many plausible stories: thus they have to be held accountable 
for choice. 22 And choice assumes intentionality. The matter of intentionality will be 
explained in the next subchapter, which introduces the motives of the politics of 
history. 
 
It is in public speeches and comments where the difference between academic and 
popular history is revealed. In the popular practice of history the past is mobilized 
for a variety of reasons. It is not submitted to critical examination or peer review.  A 
professional historian is taught to be aware of the false sense of continuity in history. 
Thus, academics are very careful drawing conclusions from the past because the 
causal linkage from past to the present day is a mental construction, which is built 
afterwards. The bridge from history to present day is always a metaphorical one and 
an academic reader is aware of the distance it depicts. However, in popular history 
the notion of what constitutes an appropriate proximity between the present day 
and history varies. National history is depicted as a sentimental, personal factor that 
directly affects the present day. Political use of history takes full advantage of that 
impression. 23 
                                                        
20 Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. 206. 
21 Torsti. 2008. 65. 
22 Torpey. 2003. 301. 
23 Seixas, Peter (ed). 2004. Theorizing historical consciousness. 10-12. 
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Motives of the politics of history 
 
According to Torsti, another way to analyze the politics of history is to focus on its 
underlying motives. According to Torsti there are three main motives, which drive 
the politics of history: foreign policy motives, domestic policy motives and motives 
based on generally accepted basic values. The motives and their subcategories are 
often intertwined and multiple motives can exists at the same time.  
 
Foreign policy motives can be divided into four subcategories. First subcategory of 
foreign policy motivation is the intention to emphasize one’s own position in 
relation to another country. It manifests itself in public statements of sympathy or 
moral condemnation. Second foreign policy subcategory is the intention to promote 
one’s own political objectives. This could be the case when a country refuses to 
condemn another country’s past human rights violations if it affects their current 
bilateral economic relationship. The third subcategory of the foreign policy motives 
is the wish to emphasize political cohesion. For example, EU countries often unite 
and present a coherent opinion on EU’s foreign policy outlines and opinions drawn 
from history, even if some member countries expressed strong statements of 
disagreement. There is strength in cohesion and this motive can overrule individual 
countries’ opinions. The fourth and last subcategory of foreign policy motives is the 
reasoning and legitimizing policy change. Torsti gives an example of the 
Government of Denmark, which justified its new and active foreign policy by ‘the 
wrong policy’ it engaged in during the Cold War. The thesis assumes that it will find 
variations of all subcategories of foreign policy motives in the correspondence 
concerning Cyprus in 1964.  
 
Second main category for the politics of history is the domestic policy motives. The 
central factor is that the establishment, state or the government wishes to 
emphasize either continuity or disconnectedness to its history. The difference 
between now and then is emphasized when certain turns of history are denied or 
belittled. On the other hand, highlighting and celebrating other events of history 
strengthens the impression that the past is still a relevant part of the society. State 
16 
 
leaders may seek legitimation for the current status quo by pointing towards 
history. Due the domestic nature of the Cypriot dispute the thesis carefully analyses 
the correspondence in the search for the domestic policy motives. 
 
The third and last category is the motives based on the generally accepted basic 
values, or: motives based on the concept of ‘the universal good’. This motive is more 
symbolic than executive. Acknowledging the value of universal human rights, 
equality and justice can promote political statements such as posthumous apologies 
or sanctifying. It is not uncommon for the state leaders to pay their respects to the 
victims of past oppression in symbolic ceremonies. Many societies cherish the idea 
of learning from the history in order to avoid repeating the past mistakes. It is 
popular rhetoric but it can also cause dissonance in the community, especially 
among its minorities, if there is a feeling that some aspects of history are valued 
higher than others.  24 
 
The thesis returns to the theoretical framework in the third chapter. The next 
chapter explain the Cyprus dispute and offers historical background for the analysis.  
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II CYPRUS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 From one foreign ruler to another  
 
‘The problem with Cyprus was not the absence of history but rather the 
overwhelming presence and influence of history.’25 
 
Cyprus has a history of being ruled by foreign powers. Situated in a strategically 
important position between the Near East and Europe, Cyprus has been an object of 
strife between powers from the beginning of its history.26 Cyprus is the third largest 
island in the Mediterranean, after Sicily and Sardinia, located east of Greece and in 
the vicinity of the coasts of Turkey and Syria.27 The Greeks originally settled the 
Eastern Mediterranean Cyprus in the second millennium BC. Until 1571 the 
population remained scarce and mostly Greek, even though there were settlers from 
Turkey, Macedonia and Italy depending on the political arrangements of the time. In 
1571, the Imperial Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus from Catholic Venice. The 
following 308 years of national Ottoman administration in Cyprus were relatively 
peaceful and stable time. 28  
 
The Ottomans settled a large amount of Turkish-speaking Muslims in the island and 
the two communities adjusted to living side by side. No remarkable conflicts 
between the two Cypriot communities were reported from that time. The peoples 
under the Ottoman were regarded on a collective basis, not personal: they were 
treated as ‘members of an ethno-religious community’ rather than individual 
subjects. Thus, the Cypriot inhabitants defined their identity primarily as Muslims 
or Christians, not as Turks or Greeks. At that time, ‘Cypriot’ was not a definition of 
an identity, rather than that of an origin. 29 The Ottoman administration allowed the 
Orthodox Church to handle its own affairs as long and the ethno-religious leader of 
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the church, Ethnarch, guaranteed its loyalty to the Ottoman sultan. 30 The Orthodox 
Church thus gained a strong position in Cyprus during the Ottoman years.  The 
Church became the leading political institution of the Greek Cypriots and the role of 
the Archbishop-Ethnarch was the political, as well as the spiritual leader of the 
Greek Cypriots. 31  
 
Cyprus did not exist in isolation during the Ottoman administration. Quite the 
contrary, the Cypriot religious leaders maintained close ecumenical links with the 
mainlands and many young Cypriots received their education in the universities 
abroad. Cypriote merchants travelled around Levant and Anatolian and many 
Cypriots were scattered around the Ottoman and Mediterranean regions. Cypriots 
spoke French in commerce, Ottoman in administration and the spoken languages of 
the Cypriots were their versions of Greek and Turkish – nearly unrecognizable 
compared to the mainland’s dialect. 32     
 
In 1878 the Great Britain leased Cyprus from the weakening Ottoman Empire. The 
British foreign policy in the 19th century was dominated by its quintessential 
wariness towards the Russian Empire. Russia, on the other hand, was known to have 
hostile relations with the Ottoman Empire and this served the British purposes. The 
British saw Cyprus as an assembly point to watch over Russia in the Mediterranean 
and to keep an eye on the developments in the Anatolian region, as the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire was beginning to look inevitable. 33 Despite the versatile and 
multi-cultural structure of Cyprus, when the British arrived in Cyprus, they 
considered and treated it as a clearly bounded territory of one population. This 
perception led to many problems in establishing the British authority in the island 
and in creating the political, ‘citizen’ identity of the Cypriots. 34   
The interest to Hellenic nationalism arose among the educated Cypriote elite – most 
of whom had received their higher education in Greece and then returned to Cyprus. 
                                                        
30 Varnava, A. & Michael, M. 2013. The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role 
of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, Their Identities and Politics. 240. & Mallinson, W. 2011. Britain and 
Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War II. 2.  
31 Anastasiou, Harry. 2011. Broken Olive Branch. 77.  
32 Bryant. 2004. 21–23.  
33 Mallinson. 2005. 10. 
34 Bryant. 2004. 21–23.  
19 
 
The core of Hellenic nationalism was based on the concept of the Grand Idea, Megali 
Idea. It strived to unite all Greeks under the same nation-state. Like many other 
national visions in the 19th century, the Megali Idea was based on the assumption 
that the freedom of an ethnic group could be achieved only in a homogenous ethno-
national state. 35 Greece incited the nationalistic flames in Cyprus and rooted the 
idea deeply into the mindset of the Greek Cypriot church and upper class. However, 
for a long time the concept of union with Greece had remained only a distant idea 
with no actual political dimensions. 36  
 
Actual unification with Greece arose to the agenda for the first time in 1878 
immediately after the British administration established control over Cyprus.  The 
British colonial administration received official requests from the Cypriot political 
leaders to cede Cyprus to Greece. The political idea and the corresponding 
emotional experience of Megali Idea was captured in the catchword of Enosis, union.  
The British colonial administration refused to consider the possibility of Enosis. It 
trusted that granting certain concessions to the imperial Cyprus would satisfy the 
Greek Cypriots and the quest for unification with Greece would soon fade away. 37  
 
The British colonial administration reformed the political structure and the 
constitution in Cyprus. They established the Legislative Council of Cyprus, which 
was a predecessor to the Cypriot Parliament, consisting of nine Greek Cypriot and 
three Turkish Cypriot members. At that time the population of Cyprus was 186 000 
people, of which around 72 per cent were Orthodox Greeks, 24 per cent Muslims, 
mostly Turks, then Maronites, Armenians and Latin. For financial reasons, the 
British administration left the two Cypriot communities responsible for the contents 
of their own tuition. Since the British did not provide any textbooks or regulate the 
curricula, both of the Cypriot communities organized their education according to 
their respective homelands, Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The education system 
also separated the two communities physically from each other, because the Turkish 
Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot children had their own school buildings and attended 
                                                        
35 Anastasiou. 2011. 76. 
36 Mallinson. 2005. 10., Richter, Heinz A. 2010. A concise history of modern Cyprus 1878-2009. 25. 
37 Anastasiou. 2011. 77. 
20 
 
different classes. It is argued that the schooling policy created a platform for 
nationalism in Cyprus. 38   
 
The exported Greek textbooks in the Greek Cypriot schools strengthened the 
prevailing Hellenic ideas and nationalism. In the history class the Greek teachers 
taught the Greek Cypriot pupils that they were a part of the glorious Hellenic 
civilization. Instead of Cyprus, the children were encouraged to consider Greece as 
their motherland, and regard the Turks as the age-old enemies of the Greeks. 39 On 
the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots pupils received education where Islam was the 
road for the stability of the nation. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic state, 
where nationalism was regarded and avoided as structural danger and nationalism 
was not encouraged in the Turkish Cypriot schools. But as the Greek Cypriot 
nationalism grew, the Turkish Cypriots became increasingly alienated from the 
Greek Cypriot community. It started to align itself more closely with the British 
colonial administration. It is argued, that the British favored and even encouraged 
this development, because internally divided Cyprus was easier to control than a 
strong and united one. 40  
 
Cyprus became officially a British Crown Colony in 1925 when the dissolute 
Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to the Great Britain. The idea of Enosis began to 
enthuse the Greek Cypriots again. Even though the idea of Enosis had originally been 
popular only among the Greek Cypriot upper class, in the 1920s and 1930s also the 
Communist party joined to demand union with Greece. That serves to demonstrate 
how the Enosis movement originally united the Greek Cypriot community from both 
sides of the political field. Union with Greece was seen as the best way to get rid of 
the Colonial rule. 41 
 
However, it did not take long until the Cypriot right and the left wing started to 
disagree about the means to achieve the union with Greece. When the Enosis 
movement started to radicalize in the 1940s, the Greek Cypriot Communist 
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Progressive Workers Party (AKEL) distanced itself from it by proposing self-
determination instead of Enosis. For the right-wing, Enosis begin to symbolize more 
than just critique against the British colonial administration: it became a symbol of 
the Greek Cypriot nationalism. 42  
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2.2 The rise of nationalism 
 
In the 1940s, the Greek Cypriot nationalists recognized global developments that 
supported their quest for Enosis.  First of all, they pointed at the Atlantic Charter, 
issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom in 1941, which emphasizes the country’s universal right to sovereignty. 
Secondly, after the Second World War, there was a strong sentiment among the 
Greek Cypriots that they were fundamentally Greeks and belonged to the Greek 
nation. At that point, majority of the Greek Cypriots saw mere self-determination 
insufficient compared to Enosis. In the post-war momentum the British were divided 
on the issue and there were segments in the colonial administration that supported 
the idea of uniting Cyprus with Greece. The British admitted that communists could 
not obtain power in Cyprus if it was strongly united with Greece. However, Britain’s 
growing fear for its former wartime ally, the USSR, made the British reluctant to give 
up its military bases in the Mediterranean. Eventually the British refused to initiate 
the decolonization of Cyprus. 43   
 
Consequently, the Enosis movement increased in popularity. The Greek Cypriot 
nationalism grew from the combination of anticolonial sentiments and the 
psychological influence of the Greek Civil War. Revolutionary nationalism was now 
facilitated and seen as the only way to achieve democracy and freedom.44  
 
For the Turkish Cypriot minority, the prospects of Enosis were grim. The Turkish 
Cypriots considered Cyprus’ unification with Greece to be a direct threat to their 
community’s security and existence in the island. The idea of the union with Greece 
disregarded the existence of the Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus, because the Turks 
constituted a non-Greek element in the all-Greek vision of Enosis. The Turkish 
Cypriots challenged the British administration for not suppressing the Greek 
Cypriot nationalism and blamed them for turning a blind eye to the violence towards 
the Turkish Cypriot community. As a response to the developments in Cyprus, the 
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defensive, contra-nationalist sentiments begin to grow among the Turkish Cypriots. 
45 
 
In the 1950s the Greek Cypriot nationalism organized itself around The National 
Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, better known as the EOKA movement.  EOKA was a 
nationalist guerrilla organization, led by a Greek Cypriot Colonel George Grivas. 
Grivas had made a career in Greece military and fought against the communists in 
the Greek civil war.  A devoted anti-Communist, Grivas led EOKA to battle in three 
fronts: first, EOKA’s main objective was to overthrow the British colonial rule using 
the tactics of guerrilla warfare. EOKA’s second objective was to clean the island of 
all Communist elements. They did so by attacking the Greek Cypriot left wing. The 
last objective for EOKA was to achieve Enosis and the complete Hellenization of 
Cyprus. The British declared EOKA a terrorist organisation and Colonel Grivas a 
wanted criminal. 46  
 
In 1958 the Turkish Cypriots formed their own nationalist political organization the 
Turkish Resistance Organisation, better known as TMT. As a response to the Greek 
Cypriots’ demand for Enosis, the TMT proposed partition, taksim, based on the 
ethnic division of the island, The Turkish Cypriot resistance, similar to the Greek 
Cypriot, was based on strong anti-communism and nationalism and thus they 
delegitimized the Greek Cypriot claim that Enosis was an all-Cypriot movement.47  
 
Demands for Enosis and taksim were fundamentally contradictive, even though they 
were based on the similar type of ethnocentric nationalism. The Greek Cypriots saw 
the Turkish Cypriot demand for taksim as a betrayal of the majority by the minority. 
The Turkish Cypriots feared that Enosis was but another way for the majority to 
oppress the minority and endanger the Turkish Cypriot identity. 48  Both nationalist 
organizations had adopted the means of acting militant and using force to achieve 
their objectives. Their demands were radical and often non-negotiable. Within their 
similarities also came their bitter rivalry: both saw themselves as justified liberation 
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movements and considered the other as a mere terrorist group. The situation in 
Cyprus began to worsen the diplomatic relations of the Cypriots communities’ 
motherlands when both Greece and Turkey offered their moral and material 
support for the nationalist movements. 49  
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2.3 Granting independence   
 
The growing tension in Cyprus had consequences far outside its regional 
boundaries. When the British government showed moral support for the Turkish 
Cypriot opposition in Cyprus, the diplomatic relationship between Greece and the 
Great Britain reached all-time low. The British had two reasons for supporting the 
Turkish resistance in Cyprus: they regarded Archbishop Makarios III, the then 
political leader of the Greek Cypriots, as an uncooperative partner in Cyprus and 
hoped that the Turkish Cypriot opposition would work to dethrone him. Secondly, 
the British accurately calculated that the prevailing turmoil in Cyprus deteriorated 
the relationship between Greece and Turkey and thus hindered the possibility for 
finding a diplomatic solution for the crisis. It ensured that the British presence in 
the island continued to be necessary in order to maintain order. Because the British 
government wished to avoid the internalization of the Cypriot conflict, it prevented 
placing the Cyprus question on the UN General Assembly’s agenda in 1954. 50  
 
In the late 1950s the problems caused by nationalism in Cyprus continued to 
escalate. The situation had stressed the relationship between Greece and Turkey to 
a breaking point and a full-blown Graeco-Turkish war was suddenly a realistic 
prospect.  The EOKA attacks also posed a serious threat to the security of the British 
colonial personnel in the island. Progress towards independence negotiations 
started when the United States became alarmed about the growing instability in the 
Mediterranean. The British were pressured to accept the US demand to begin the 
Cypriote independence negotiations. 51 Following the British example, both Greece 
and Turkey also agreed to sit down at the negotiation table. The motherlands now 
found themselves in a situation where they felt morally obligated to keep on 
supporting the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalist movements, while at 
the same time looking for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The motherlands 
distanced themselves from the most radical Cypriot nationalist sectors and began to 
support more moderate elements of the communities. 52   
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Turkey, Greece, the US and the Great Britain sat down at the negotiation table in the 
so-called the Zürich-London Talks in 1958-1960. The Cypriot leaders were not 
included in the first rounds of negotiations since the matter was considered to be 
primarily between the motherlands and the colonial power. The Great Britain’s 
decision to include Turkey in the independence negotiations made it a permanent 
party in the Cyprus dispute. 53  
 
The negotiations eventually led to the London Agreements in 1958, when the British 
accepted that instead of preserving its complete control over Cyprus it would secure 
only a couple of sovereign military bases in the island.. The agreements were a 
compromise between the British, Greek and Turkish interests and these agreements 
were the backbone of the constitution of the independent Republic of Cyprus.  The 
London Agreements required that the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had 
to relinquish the idea of Enosis and taksim and accept independence instead.54  
 
The Zürich-London Talks defined the structure and architecture of the independent 
Cyprus. The EOKA and TMT movements were pressured to put down their arms and 
accept the peace agreement. EOKA leader Colonel Grivas was forced to exile Cyprus. 
The Turkish Cypriots agreed on the solution after they were given assurances that 
the new Constitution would safeguard their minority rights and guarantee special 
veto powers in the government, or in other words: the Constitution would protect 
them against the autocracy of a majority. 55   
 
The independent Republic of Cyprus was established in August 1960. The Greek 
Cypriot leader Makarios III was elected as the first President of the Republic of 
Cyprus and a Turkish Cypriot Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected as the first Vice-President 
of Cyprus.  Along the declaration of independence, the Republic of Cyprus on the one 
part, and Turkey, Greece and Britain on the other part signed the Treaty of 
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Guarantee, in which they committed to guarantee the independency of Cyprus and 
to ensure that the provision of the new Constitution were respected at all times. 56  
 
The Cypriote Constitution had four provisions. First, it recognized that there were 
two separate and distinct communities in Cyprus. The second provision assured that 
both communities participated in the functions of the government and secured the 
rights of the minority against the larger community by partial administrative 
autonomy. The third provision acknowledged human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The last provision, Article IV, created a complex system of guarantees of 
the supremacy of the Constitution. 57  
 
The Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee provided that any of the three guaranteeing 
countries was allowed to intervene in Cyprus for the sake of preserving the 
constitutional order, even without the consent of the other guaranteeing Powers.58 
The Article IV was eventually used as the legal basis for the Turkish invasion in 
Cyprus in 1974.59 The Treaty of Guarantee revealed the guaranteeing states’ doubts 
about the durability of the Cypriot independency. It could be assumed that they did 
not expect independence to bring peace and stability in Cyprus. 
 
Both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were disappointed at the 
structure of the independency, primarily because they considered it to be a forced 
compromise. The Cypriot nationalists felt that the Constitution was imposed on 
Cyprus from the outside and both sides bear strong reservations about the future of 
the republic. 60 
 
The 1960 Constitution proved indeed to be an inadequate basis for the peaceful 
future in Cyprus. It is argued that it never attained legitimacy in the eyes of the Greek 
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Cypriots. 61 After being pressured to abandon the idea of Enosis and accept 
independence instead, the nationalist Greek Cypriot segment could not tolerate the 
concessions provided for the Turkish Cypriot community. Even though the Turkish 
Cypriots constituted less than 20 % of the Cypriot population, they were provided 
with 30 % of the seats in the House of Representatives and Cabinet posts. The 
Turkish Cypriot representatives and the Vice-President could exercise veto in the 
governmental decisions and the ratio of Greek to Turkish soldiers was in favor of 
the Turkish Cypriots. When the Vice-President Kücük vetoed Makarios’ decision to 
set up integrated armed forces in 1961, the President refused to create an army at 
all. Consequently, paramilitant forces were set up at both sides on the island. 62 In 
addition, the Cypriot Government was not successful in improving the remarkably 
worse economic situation of the Turkish Cypriots. To the Turkish community this 
felt like an expression of indifference towards their cause by the majority of the 
Government. 63  
 
In 1963, the Greek Cypriot part of the Cypriot Government, began to design 
amendments to the Constitution. The Greek Cypriots wished to improve the 
efficiency of the administration by cutting the Turkish Cypriots’ minority rights and 
consequently reducing their influence in the Government. In November 1963 
President Makarios revealed his final 13 amendment propositions. These 
suggestions are known as Makarios’ 13 Points. The amendments were deemed 
premature and unacceptable by the Turkish Cypriots, who speculated that Makarios 
was just paving the way towards Enosis again.  The guaranteeing power Turkey 
downright rejected the proposals even before the Turkish Cypriot community. 64  
 
It remains unclear, why Makarios decided to propose such radical amendments, 
when it was clear that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would not accept the terms. 
It has been speculated that by proposing unacceptable amendments to the Turkish 
Cypriots, Makarios and his government had a chance to dismiss the London 
Agreements.  The Greek Cypriots could claim that co-working with the Turkish 
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Cypriots was impossible and thus deem the current Constitution dysfunctional. 
Consequently, inter-communal violence inflamed again in Cyprus.65   
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2.4 Timeline of the events from December 1963 to December 1964   
 
Following the political developments, the tensions in Cyprus escalated and firing 
broke out in Nicosia on the 21st of December 1963. The Greek Cypriots had begun to 
conduct stop and searches on Turkish Cypriots civilians, which was perceived as a 
humiliating and disrespecting practice by the Turkish Cypriots. On the 21st of 
December, two Greek Cypriot special constables, i.e. members of the unofficial Greek 
Cypriot armed force, were conducting a search on a Turkish woman and her male 
escort in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia when an angry crowd approached. The 
Greek Cypriots opened fire, killing two Turkish Cypriots. After that, more Greek 
Cypriots joined the firing and the unrest in the Turkish quarter lasted over the 
Christmas days 66  
 
Following the Christmas Day incidents, a lot of Turkish Cypriots relocated to 
guarded enclaves and many Turkish Cypriot civil servants ceased to attend to their 
offices in the Greek Cypriot areas. Depending on the perspective, their act was either 
a withdrawal or an exclusion from the Governmental functions. Either way, the 
Turkish Cypriots were soon facing severe economic plight in the absence of salaried 
jobs and with the loss of agricultural income resulting from the exodus to the 
enclaves. 67  
 
The year 1964 begin with many Turkish and Greek Cypriots dead and over 30 000 
Turkish Cypriots relocated in enclaves. The economic blockade and restrictions on 
the freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriots made the situation tense.  On the 
1st of January 1964, President Makarios declared in the Cypriot radio that there was 
an armed Turkish rebellion in the island, and that the Constitution was dead. 
Makarios continued to retract the Cyprus Treaties. The statement unnerved the 
Guaranteeing States and on the 15th of January the UK, Greece and Turkey met with 
the representatives of both Cypriot communities in London in order to find a 
solution to the crisis. These negotiations ended unrewarding. There was a general 
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understanding that no solution could be found unless the violence in the island 
stopped. 68   
 
Spring 1964 witnessed many violent incidents in Cyprus as the Greek Cypriot 
National Forces and Turkish fighting groups continued to clash. The dispute was 
now on the UN Security Council’s agenda and in March 1964 Turkey made it clear 
that if the UN would not act to halt the violence, Turkey would not hesitate to use its 
rights as a Guaranteeing Power to intervene in the island. The UN answered with 
the Resolution No. 186 to create the UN Security Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The 
resolution was adopted on the 4th of March 1964 and UNFICYP became operational 
by the end of the same month. A contingent of around 6000 international UN 
soldiers arrived in Cyprus. The Secretary General also nominated an UN Mediator to 
negotiate with the two communities in order to find a diplomatic solution to the 
crisis. However, the peace keeping troops were in many cases unable to stop the 
violence, such as on the 11th of May in Famagusta when the killing of three Greek 
officials led to the abduction of 32 Turkish Cypriots, later to be presumed dead. 69  
 
Apart from stabilizing the existing situation, the UN peacekeeping force had no 
mandate to enforce peace if there was no political wish to maintain it. It has also 
been argued that even though UNFICYP was a crucial asset in maintaining peace, its 
existence in Cyprus decelerated the mediation process because it exempted the 
conflicting parties from the heaviest urgency of political pressure.70 Following 
UNFICYP’s inability to prevent the violence in Cyprus, in June 1964 Turkey again 
threatened with an armed intervention in Cyprus. This time, the U.S. President 
Johnson sent a direct letter to the Prime Minister of Turkey to declare that it would 
not allow the use of Turkey’s American weapons in Cyprus. Consequently, Turkey 
withheld its intervention but the international situation remained tense and the 
world’s super powers monitored the developments in Cyprus carefully. 71 
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In spring 1964, the Turkish Cypriots started to question the Cypriot ambassador 
Zenon Rossides’ legal status in the Security Council. The Turkish Cypriots felt that 
Rossides cannot legally and constitutionally represent both of the Cypriot 
communities. Because the Turkish Cypriots were no longer represented in the 
Cypriot Government, the representative of the Cyprus Government could not speak 
on their behalf.  The Turkish Cypriots nominated Raul Denktas, the President of the 
Turkish Communal Chamber, to the represent them in the Security Council. 72  
Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Dr. Kücük, Rauf Denktash and the Greek Cypriot 
representatives, President Makarios, Zenon Rossides and his follower Clerides were 
the main opponents in the dispute in 1964.  
 
The UN were from the beginning of the crisis unwilling to compromise their 
impartiality. In his report of the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, the then-
Secretary General U Thant admits that there has been ‘irresponsibility and 
callousness toward human life’ and ‘savage acts’ in Cyprus, but refuses to assess 
blame on one side or the other.73 In mid-summer 1964 the Turkish Red Crescent 
estimated that it had over 56 000 Turkish Cypriots in its assistance roll, of whom 
over half were refugees. U Thant states that the Greek Cypriot forces outnumbered 
the Turkish Cypriot armed forces and that the Government of Cyprus had received 
around 5000 Greek volunteers from the mainland, whereas only 300 Turkish 
citizens were reported to have arrived in Cyprus. In September 1964 the Greek 
Cypriot force constituted of around 24 000 men and the Turkish Cypriot fighting 
element of around 10 000 men. The Secretary General concluded that the 
Government forces were capable of overrunning the Turkish Cypriot defenses 
rapidly if they wished to do so. The situation worsened when the former EOKA 
leader, Colonel Grivas returned to Cyprus in July and to lead the Greek Cypriot and 
Greek armed forces. 74  
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On the 6-7th of August in 1964 the Greek Cypriot forces attacked the only remaining 
Turkish-held coastal area in Mansoura-Kokkina bridgehead. Turkey sent jets to 
intervene – an act that Turkey called a justified policy action to halt the attack on 
Turkish Cypriots, whereas the Cypriot Government condemned it as aggression. 
Much of the Greek Cypriots military equipment was destroyed in the Turkish aerial 
bombings and the Greek Cypriots suffered many civilian casualties. Subsequently, 
no more armed attacks occurred that year, but the Cypriot Government tightened 
its economic blockade on the Turkish enclaves. 75 The dispute remained in the 
Security Council’s agenda as the UN monitored its peacekeeping efforts in the island.  
 
The violence from December 1963 to December 1964 caused approximately 191 
dead and 209 missing, presumed to be dead, Turkish Cypriots and 133 killed and 41 
missing, also presumed to be dead, Greek Cypriots.76 Both Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot sides contributed their own meaning to the outbursts of violence in 
1964. The Greek Cypriots accused the Turkish Cypriots for deliberately 
undermining the republic in order to obtain the partition of the island. The Turkish 
Cypriots, on the other hand, argued that they did only what was necessary in order 
to protect their community. The Turkish Cypriots add that by proposing 
unacceptable amendments, the Greek Cypriots deliberately pushed the Turkish 
Cypriots away from the administration in order to strive their own political agenda. 
Neither of these explanations, however, explains why both sides were so ill-
prepared and had not taken precautions when the crisis started. 77  
 
Year 1964 ended in a tense stalemate. The Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn 
themselves to the guarded enclaves and continued to question the Cypriot 
Government’s legality. The UNFICYP force remained in the island and guarded the 
ceasefire line between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Violence flamed 
up in 1974 when a military junta overthrew the Greek Government and pressure to 
reach Enosis increased in Cyprus. After 1967 the tensions in Cyprus subsided again 
until 1974 when the Greek military junta organized a coup d’état against Makarios 
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and gained control over Cyprus. The following Turkish invasion divided the island 
into two parts and sealed as the unofficial border78 between the Greek Cypriots and 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 79   
 
The next chapters focus on the politics of history behind the two sides’ negotiations 
in 1964 and seeks to demonstrate how different versions of the conflict were 
narrated. It could be assumed that the incapability to find a diplomatic solution to 
the crisis in 1964 was partly due to the fact that the conflicting sides were also 
incapable of agreeing what caused the crisis in the first place.   
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III. ANALYSIS: SAME CONFLICT, DIFFERENT NARRATIVES 
 
The Security Council included the Cyprus dispute in its agenda in December 1963.80 
The London peace negotiations in January 1964 ended inconclusive, the dispute 
gained international attention and the pressure to find a diplomatic solution to the 
crisis increased. In their correspondence towards the Security Council, both Cypriot 
sides were trying to convince the Security Council Members to support their version 
of the events and thus gain recognition and justification in the eyes of the world. The 
events in Cyprus were also widely covered by the international press, but the focus 
of the analysis is on the letters and reports directed at the Security Council by the 
conflict States.  
 
Nationalism played and still plays a crucial role in the Cypriot conflict. In the 
analysis, by ‘nationalism’ the thesis refers to the definition of ethno nationalism, 
which strives to form a nation based on an ethnic group’s self-determination.81  To 
understand the politics of history in 1964, it is crucial to understand the nationalist 
mind-set behind the argumentation. The thesis assumes that nationalism is an 
important factor in the manner the Cypriot representatives formed their statements 
and opinions in 1964. To see if nationalism is intertwined with the source material, 
the chapter projects certain theories of nationalism into the analysis. The thesis 
assumes that the history of being ruled by foreign powers has had its impact on the 
strength and nature of Cypriote nationalism. It is argued that a bigger group’s 
ambition for domination and smaller group’s fear for annihilation are often the 
result from the liberation of the old regime and linked with the process of gaining 
self-determination and independence. 82 The thesis also ponders whether by 
seeking union with Greece, which is seen as a Western, European nation, the Greek 
Cypriot were trying to set themselves apart from Turkey and the long Oriental 
tradition of the Ottoman Era.  
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It should be remembered, that nationalism has a ‘dual’ nature: it satisfies basic 
societal needs to ‘belong’ to a group, but on the other hand it has a tendency to 
arouse conflicts, ethnic cleansings and other atrocities against the other ethnic 
group. Nationalism in Cyprus was closely intertwined with the concept of self-
determination, which is categorically accepted as a good thing. However, if the 
implementing of the national self-determination is left to the majority group alone, 
it is likely to cause protest and resistance among the other groups who are affected 
by that self-determination and fear that their rights are endangered. 83  
 
It is argued that even though ethno-national conflicts may partly result from the 
reemergence of old hatreds and history perceptions, they must also be analyzed in 
the light of the current events: in the fears and possibilities that emergence in the 
break of the old structure. Even though the focus of the analysis is on the different 
history perceptions and the political use of history, the thesis is careful not to 
oversimplify the matter as a mere framework for politics of history. When we look 
into the correspondence of the Greek or Turkish Cypriots, it should be kept in mind 
that even though history perceptions and collective memories may magnify the 
emotions of the representatives, their experiences are still the results of the current 
events in Cyprus. 84  
 
The analysis chapters examine the most frequent themes in the 1964s 
correspondence. The correspondence was directed to the international community 
and therefore the main focus of the analysis is what kind of history the different 
sides are presenting to the United Nations. The two sides clearly had conflicting 
attitudes about the issue. Unless mentioned otherwise, the letters are directed to the 
President of the Security Council or to the Secretary General, all asked to be 
circulated as official documents in the Security Council so that they would reach as 
wide an audience as possible. The chapters also asserts the aspects of Cypriot 
nationalism into the analysis.  
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3.1 Contradictions in the nationalist mindsets  
 
During the Ottoman administration, the Cypriots had primarily identified 
themselves according to religion as Muslims or Christian Orthodox, which at that 
time did not result in rivalry. However, already during the Ottoman administration, 
the educated Greek Cypriots were drawn towards the intellectual trends of 
European romanticism. It created a historical connection between the Greek 
Cypriots and the Hellenic world and strengthened the Greek Cypriots’ identification 
with Greece, and subsequently with Europe. It set them apart from the Ottoman 
ruler and Orientalism. The Greek Cypriots’ fascination with Greece and Hellenism 
led to the rise of radical Greek nationalism. Consequently, the Cypriots started to 
identify themselves more ethnocentrically Turks or Greeks. 85 It is argued that the 
Greek Cypriots saw the struggle for Cyprus as a continuum of the age-old struggle 
for the sacred Hellenic nationalism. In their narrative Cyprus was a primordially 
Greek nation, with no regards of the historical influences of the other cultures in the 
island. In the Greek Cypriot nationalist mindset Turkish Cypriot community was an 
anomaly in the island. 86 
 
Nationalism comes with the internalized idea of a nation state formed by an 
ethnically homogenous group. It is argued, that the Cypriot conflict derives partly 
from this idea, which makes it consequently a so-called prolonged ethno-national 
conflict. Typical to the protracted ethno-national conflicts is the concept of deep 
histories. Deep histories are mental constructions, which guide how one perceives 
one’s own history and behavior in relation to others.  They result from the tendency 
to construct moral narratives from the past events. In conflict situations, deep 
histories turn history into an active actor. Typical argumentation for deep histories 
involve contesting claims such as ‘we were here first’ or ‘this is our land’. 87  
 
Another contradicting aspect in ethno-national group identities is that the defining 
components such as land and history are perceived to belong exclusively to one’s 
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own group. Other group’s claim to the same components is seen as a threat or a 
dishonesty. Ethno-national groups also construct their identity monolithically, i.e. 
expecting that all sides of their identity are correlated. In other words, a monolithic 
national identity expects that the ethnic boundaries are correlated with the political 
boundaries, and state boundaries are correlated with the national boundaries. 
When two national identities exist in a same small space, such as in Cyprus, the only 
way to resolve the contradictions would be to negotiate these monolithic and 
exclusive identity constructions and agree on disassociating boundaries. 88 The 
Cypriot representatives in 1964, however, did not express readiness to such 
negotiations.  
 
The Greek Cypriots: An infiltrated enemy threatens the Cypriot nation 
 
Galo Plaza, the UN Mediator in Cyprus, points out in 1965 that to understand the 
dispute in Cyprus it is crucial to remember that the arrival at independence in 
Cyprus did not follow a traditional path of a nationalist movement winning its 
sovereignty against the colonial power. In Cyprus, the strongest political pressure 
had not been directed at the independence but at the union, Enosis, with Greece. The 
Greek Cypriots perceived the 1960 Constitution and independence to be a mere 
compromise solution.89 It did not take long after the independency before their 
aspirations towards unification rose again. At this point Enosis had evolved into 
being a keyword for nationalism and Greek Cypriot self-determination in Cyprus 
and was no longer identical with the original Greek Megali Idea.  
 
After the first peace negotiations in January 1964, the Greek Cypriots write to the 
Security Council that the violence and unrest in Cyprus are regrettable because ‘(…) 
the destiny of the island has been, and is, that of a bridge to unity and not of a focus of 
friction and violence to which the Turkish partition policy has brought to it.’90 This 
statement arguable supports the idea of Enosis (‘a bridge to unity’) and employs a 
domestic motive for referring to the history of the island. When the Greek Cypriots 
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imply that they are guiding the nation to its predefined destiny, they emphasize their 
connectedness to the history and defend their actions towards the Turkish Cypriots.  
The statement also echoes the ideas of the Greek Cypriot nationalist deep history:  
Cyprus is a part of the Hellenic world and the Greek Cypriots’ struggle is their 
national quest. The concept has a precondition that a nation has a destiny of its own.  
 
In order to create a coherent deep history there is an affinity with presenting the 
nation as having its own ethnocentric existence and destiny through time.  The 
protagonist, or in other words: the nation, has to remain present from the beginning 
to the end. When the nation itself is envisioned as the protagonist, it must also 
appear homogenous with no internal fractions.  It cultivates and transmits the idea 
of the sacred national history, which is set apart from all other histories. In 
nationalist historiographies the nation stays morally unblemished. Thus, the nation 
itself is not guilty of historical wrongdoings or atrocities, but there is an internal or 
an external enemy to blame. 91 
 
When the Greek Cypriot representative Zenon Rossides writes to the Security 
Council in September 1964, he asserts the blame about the violence in Cyprus on the 
foreign Turkish radicals. According to Rossides, the extremists Turks have 
infiltrated in the island and are trying to bring about the partition policy as 
envisioned in Ankara and ‘… the Turkish minority thus becomes a pawn in the pursuit 
of a sinister policy wholly alien to its interests.’ 92 If the Turkish Cypriots were to be 
freed from the Turkish influence and the exported fanaticism, they would stop their 
resistance and follow their natural course of peaceful co-existence with the 
majority.93 The Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou, also 
enforces the same opinion, when he states to the Security Council that in the past all 
the people in the island had lived peacefully together and the recent fighting and 
unrest are symptoms of other causes. 94 The Foreign Minister does not elaborate 
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what he means by the other causes, but in the light of the Greek Cypriot starting 
point, it is safe to assume that he indicates towards the alleged Turkish agitators and 
rebels in the island.  
 
Arguing that the fighting and violence is caused by an external Turkish influence in 
Cyprus reinforces a certain type of history. Throughout their communication the 
Greek Cypriot representatives carefully assert the blame on the armed Turkish 
fighters, rather than to the civilian Turkish Cypriots.  It creates a narrative where 
the prevailing peace in Cyprus is disturbed by the arrival of the Turkish terrorists. 
The Greek Cypriots thus find the natural antagonist and enemy to their national 
history from the partition-seeking Turks. It also exempts the nation itself from 
responsibility¸ which is another aspect of a nationalist deep history. The reports of 
the Turkish Cypriot civilian casualties just go to prove how the ultimate antagonist 
Turkey is ready to sacrifice its own people in its quest for partition and annexation 
of the island, while the Cypriot Government forces are only trying to defend the 
island. 
 
The Turkish Cypriots: Majority threatens smaller group’s identity and existence 
 
From the Turkish Cypriot side, the narrative is of the Enosis-driven Greek Cypriots 
who are systematically trying to annihilate the Turkish Cypriots. They challenge the 
Greek Cypriote claim that the crisis is domestic and intercommunal in nature. For 
the Turkish Cypriots that is ‘(…) a trick for finding the untenable excuse to argue that 
the Treaty of Guarantee is non-effective with the intention of getting a free license to 
continue the massacre of the Turks under the umbrella of the UN.’ 95 The Treaty of 
Guarantee granted the Guaranteeing Powers a permission to protect the 1960 
Constitution, if necessary even by an armed intervention.96 The Turkish Cypriots 
emphasize that their fate depends on the international community’s resolution to 
keep the Cypriot crisis in its agenda. That is an effective sentiment of victimhood in 
the pretext of reminding the international community and the UN of its 
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responsibilities. It highlights one’s own helplessness and victimhood and the other 
side’s cunningness. The analysis covers the narratives of victimhood in the next 
chapter.  
 
The Turkish Cypriot representative fears that their community is forced to abandon 
its Turkish identity. The core of the Enosis movement is the idea that Greece is the 
motherland of the Greek Cypriots. However, the Turkish Cypriots feel like they are 
not allowed to gaze upon Turkey as their motherland, because according to the 
Greek Cypriote argumentation, it would only bring partition and violence in the 
island. 97 The Greek Cypriots have indeed argued that the whole idea of partition 
should be unacceptable to a Cypriot person, ´ (…) who is a Cypriot, and not alien or 
hostile to the country.’98 In other words, the Greek Cypriots express that those 
Turkish Cypriots who support partition cannot be considered as true Cypriots. To 
them, the prospect of partition threatens the whole ethnocentric existence of the 
Cypriot nation. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots consider partition to be the 
best practice to protect their minority identity. 
 
The statements show a contradiction in the Greek Cypriot narrative. To pursue 
union with Greece, they argue that Cyprus belongs to the Hellenic world and that 
the Greek Cypriots are Greeks, while to deny the Turkish Cypriot wish for partition, 
they argue that Cypriots form a distinct group of Cypriots. Dr. Kücük, the Turkish 
Cypriot Vice-President of Cyprus, identifies this paradox in his letter to the Security 
Council, where he reminds the UN that even President Makarios himself has once 
argued that Cyprus is not a homogenous nation but a state consisted of Greek and 
Turk nationalities.99  
 
Majority of the Turkish Cypriot civilian population moved into guarded enclaves in 
the beginning of the crisis. In August 1964, the Greek Cypriots complain that the 
Turkish rebels are forcing the Turkish Cypriot refugees to remain in their enclaves 
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in order to reach de facto partition. 100 Turkey, who by the end of 1964 often spoke 
for the Turkish Cypriots, replies that it is the fear for the Greek Cypriot armed forces 
that keeps the Turkish Cypriots in their enclaves.  Those Turkish Cypriots who have 
tried to return to their villages have paid for it with their lives. According to Turkey, 
the mere fact that the Greeks are ignoring this shows how deliberately they are 
trying to misguide the Security Council and the world’s opinion. 101 
 
The Turkish representative suggests that the Security Council takes a look back in 
the recent history: the same Turkish Cypriot civilians who suffered in the hands of 
the EOKA fighters in the 1950s are now forced to relive the terror of those years. 102 
However, the EOKA terrorism was mostly targeted towards the British colonial 
administration and left-wing Greek Cypriots, while terrorizing the Turkish Cypriots 
was not in EOKA’s agenda.  Some Turkish Cypriots were among the civilian 
casualties following the bombings and violence, especially when the British 
recruited Turks as policemen, but the Turkish community was not EOKA’s target 
itself. 103 Turkish representative is thus creating a version of history where EOKA’s 
actions were from the beginning directed towards the Turkish Cypriot population.  
It gives the impression that the Turkish Cypriots have encountered violence from 
the Greek Cypriots for a long time before 1964.  
 
The Secretary General reports to the Security Council in 12th of December 1964 that 
both of the versions about the Turkish Cypriot enclaves are, to an extent, factually 
correct. The Turkish Cypriots are implementing self-segregation policy by refusing 
to return to their villages, but it is also true that the Greek Cypriot irregular armed 
forces and the National Guard pose a real threat to the Turkish Cypriot civilians. The 
Turkish Cypriots are waiting for the final settlement to the crisis before they feel 
safe to return to their villages.104 
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The comments about the enclaves can be analyzed from the politics of history 
perspective. First, both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot letters pose correct facts, 
while at the same time giving completely different versions of the events. The fact 
that Turkey speaks in behalf of the Turkish Cypriots shows how it wishes to 
emphasize its own position in relation to Cyprus. Turkey condemns the actions of 
the EOKA fighters in the 1950s as well as it condemns the atrocities that have 
happened in 1964. It also reveals that Turkey considers the events in Cyprus and 
the fate of the Turkish Cypriots to be of its concern. The feeling of historical 
connectedness between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots strengthens as the conflict 
prolongs. Third, the Secretary General’s remark that the Cypriots are waiting for the 
final settlement before they take steps towards peace is typical to the politics of 
history. It reveals that both sides are waiting for their own struggle and sacrifices to 
be declared righteous by the international community before they agree to 
renounce their positions.  
 
It is argued, that the Cypriot situation can be compared to the teleological history 
perception of the Medieval Times. At that time people waited for the divine ‘Final 
Judgement’ to reward them for their righteousness and punish their enemies for 
their sins. In ethno-national crises the efforts to meddle the crisis or to even pave 
the road towards peaceful solution are often postponed until the time of the final 
solution. Neither side wishes to take steps towards peace before the final solution is 
reached and the other side’s history is ruled meaningless and treacherous and one’s 
own side pronounced sacred and justified. In the Cypriot case, the final solution 
would have been the international community’s recognition and support. Waiting 
for the final solution hinders the international mediating processes when the 
conflicting sides refuse to admit their own side’s atrocities. 105 
 
The Turkish Cypriot representative Rauf Denktas makes an interesting remark 
when he writes to the Security Council in March 1964. According to Denktas, the 
Greek Cypriots had every intention to annihilate the whole Turkish population from 
the island in the violent incidents that started in December 1963. The only reason 
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why they were not successful was because the Turkish fighters showed unexpected 
resistance. ‘It is because all Turks in Cyprus felt, thought and acted as one that the 
atrocious Greek plan to wipe us out with a single stroke failed.’ 106 First, Denktas 
implies that the Greek Cypriot attacks against the Turkish population were 
organized and premeditated – something that the Cypriot Government never 
admitted. Second, he describes how the threat of annihilation united the Turkish 
Cypriots and third, how they are now forced to fight in order to protect their 
existence in the island. In the Turkish Cypriot narrative, the Greek Cypriot 
Government is the main antagonist and they can find protection only from 
remaining united as Turks.  
 
Instead of seeking compromise the Cypriot communities were putting their efforts 
into maximizing their victimhood, which exempted them from responsibility and 
downplayed the sufferings of the other. 107 The next chapter takes a closer look to 
the methods of using narratives of victimhood and historically charged terms in 
order to gain support to political objectives.   
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3.2 Creating narratives of victimhood to discredit the other 
 
‘Calomniez, calomniez, il restera toujours quelque chose.’108  
 
On the 24th of February the Turkish representative accuses the Greek Cypriot 
Government forces of driving 700 Turkish Cypriots out of their homes in the village 
of Polis and trapping them inside a school building without food or medical supplies. 
109 The Greek Cypriot answer arrives a day later, categorically denying all the 
allegations that anything extraordinary is happening in Polis: ‘(…) the Acting 
Representative of Turkey, obviously trying to impress by vehemence in expression, 
narrates a tale of siege and hardship involving 700 Turkish Cypriots living in the 
village of Polis.’ 110 This pattern repeats itself multiple times in the 1964 
correspondence: the more Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots accuse the Greek 
Cypriote Government forces of atrocities and crimes against the Turkish Cypriot 
civilian population, the more ardently the Greek Cypriots deny everything. 
 
What can be interpreted from the material is that the Cypriot and Turkish 
representatives do not seek to communicate to each other but merely use their 
letters to justify their cause in the Security Council. It could be argued that they are 
deeply engaged in dialectical noncommunication, or in other words, that they are 
diminishing communication into empty rhetoric and avoiding true dialogue with 
each other. It is argued, that the nature of the nationalist historiography resists 
dialogue with the rival nationalist historiography. Because the nationalist mental 
frameworks are fundamentally identical, they are also mutually exclusive to one 
another. In other words, nationalist historiographies are antithetical towards each 
other. During and after 1964 the communication in the UN between the conflict 
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sides was limited to impersonal messages, stereotyping, narratives of victimhood 
and nationalist rhetoric as instruments of manipulation. The process of suppressing 
communication into mere nationalist rhetoric is called dialectical 
noncommunication.  Instead of mutual dialogue, the communication is seen as an 
instrument to promote one’s own nationalist views. 111  
 
All representatives employ strong expressions in their letters. Certain words have a 
very clear sentimental power attached to them and they create certain associations 
to the reader. The Turkish Ambassador writes to the Security Council that the 
beleaguered Turkish Cypriots are forced to ‘live in conditions comparable to those 
existing in concentration camps.’ 112 On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots accuse the 
Turks of using extreme expressions and terms like ‘massacre’ and ‘genocide’ for the 
historical aspects associated with them. The Greek Cypriots go on to argue that 
Turkey produces similar propaganda to that of the Nazi regime and that it is the 
Turkish extremists themselves who are creating the concentration camp conditions 
for the Cypriot civilian population. 113  
 
The use of the politics of history is quite easily detected in the extreme expressions 
and simplified narratives. Accusing the enemy of forcing civilians into concentration 
camps creates associations with Holocaust and the atrocities towards civilian 
populations during the II World War. It also brings forth memories of ethnic 
cleansings and genocides. Because the UN was created in the aftermath of the II 
World War and its principles were set towards maintaining the international 
peace114, the Nazi references were sure to attract the attention of the Security 
Council.  
 
It should be kept in mind that nationalist argumentation is often intertwined with 
the narratives of victimhood. Current events are endorsed with overly simplified 
narratives of the past sufferings, which serve nationalist sentiments about the age-
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old struggle with the current enemy. The simplified narrative disregards the fact 
that historical events are often the outcome of complex political actions and that the 
difference between the victim and oppressor is not black and white. In narratives of 
victimhood, history is used to revisit and cite the past selectively. It compresses 
individual experiences into a single, homogenous ethno nationalist story, which can 
be used in public culture when deemed necessary. 115  
 
On the 12th of March in 1964 Dr. Kücük, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of 
Cyprus, sends an appeal to the UN to use its best practices to stop the violence in 
Cyprus. According to him, what the Turkish Cypriots have had to endure ‘are crimes 
against humanity which surpasses terror which devastated Budapest.’ 116 Kücük does 
not elaborate his statement any further, giving the impression that the Budapest 
reference must be axiomatic to the audience and refer to an incident in the recent 
history that bear particularly significance to the UN and the world. The thesis 
assumes that Kücük means the events of 1956, when the Soviet army suppressed 
the Hungarian uprising in Budapest by force, causing multiple civilian casualties.117 
That would reveal that the Turkish Cypriots do not expect the USSR to support their 
cause in the Security Council.  
 
Implying that the Soviet regime’s actions in Budapest were ‘crimes against 
humanity’, shows that Kücük knows that his best chances for finding support in the 
Security Council are from the US and the NATO countries – apart from Greece. The 
rest of the letter can be interpreted as a direct appeal to these countries: ´If some 
action is not taken forthwith to put an end to this genocide attempt not only with the 
massacre or ruining of Cyprus Turks go down in history as a stain of the free world but 
will be a defeating blow to the UN and for all that you and all peace-loving persons 
have strived for.’118 The Hungarian uprising was also brought to the UN in 1956 and 
it is argued that their incapability to take effective measures determined much of 
the fate of the Hungarian people.119  
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The backbone of the UN’s right to intervene in a country is that any nation that 
violates basic human rights risks an international intervention. It is possible that 
with his letter Kücük wishes to remind the UN what the consequences of the UN’s 
indecisiveness to intervene were for the Budapest population. One scholarly 
category for the politics of history is its motivation based on the generally accepted 
basic values. Kücük appeals to the Security Council to act in order to halt the 
massacre of the Cyprus Turks and to prevent causing a ‘defeating blow’ to the whole 
free world. He encourages the Security Council to learn from the history and to avoid 
the same mistakes it made in Budapest.  
 
To assimilate the plight of the Turkish Cypriots to the history of the Hungarian 
protesters creates two possible of narratives. First, it may reveal that the Turkish 
Cypriot Vice President himself affirms that there is a Turkish Cypriot rebellion in the 
island. In Budapest the incident started as a student demonstration and developed 
into a full uprising, which the Soviet army repressed with a superior military power, 
causing civilian casualties. It is possible that Dr. Kücük wishes to remind the Security 
Council that even though the Turkish Cypriots are uprising against the Government 
forces, they, too, are ill equipped and outnumbered and fighting for the principle of 
self-determination. The rebellion is a justified act of self-defense and struggle 
against the oppressor in a form of uprising.  
 
Second possible narrative is that Kücük is comparing the Cypriot Government to the 
Soviet Government. In 1964 the Cypriot Government and President Makarios were 
indeed maintaining good relations with the Soviets120 and the Soviet representative 
had articulated from the beginning of the crisis that they would not tolerate it if 
outside Powers intervened in the internal matters of Cyprus and that the USSR 
would not remain impassive if a military conflict arose near its southern border.121 
The USSR stated that Cyprus should be allowed to solve its domestic problems in the 
manner that best served their national interests. The USSR supported the Cypriot 
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Government’s position that Turkey is the oppressor and any international attempt 
to intervene in Cyprus would constitute a breach on the sovereignty principle of the 
United Nations. 122   
 
The USSR manifested its support for the Cypriot Government in calling for the 
principles of state-sovereignty and integrity in the UN. But considering the Cold War 
tensions that time, it is safe to assume that the USSR also calculated that it could 
benefit from the unstable situation in Cyprus. First, the crisis in the Mediterranean 
worsened the relationship between two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey. The 
USSR did not wish to see the NATO influence increasing in the Mediterranean any 
more than the Western countries wished to see communism spreading in that area.  
Second, it was possible that the USSR speculated that a politically unstable, 
independent Cyprus would be more receptive to communism than annexed Cyprus 
would be. All things considered, it seems likely that the USSR was partly motivated 
by its own foreign policy objectives when it demanded the UN to apply their 
historical principles of respecting state sovereignty in Cyprus. It should be added, 
that even though the US and the UK also had their interests intertwined in the 
conflict, they remained relatively quiet in the Security Council. The US kept its eyes 
on Turkey but did not give many public statements about Cyprus in the Security 
Council.  The British government worked hard to solve the crisis with private 
negotiations with the conflict partners. In 1964, this diplomatic approach proved to 
be an inadequate measure.123  
 
Even after the UN peacekeeping forces were dispatched to Cyprus in March 1964, 
the tension in the island did not unwind. In June 1964 the Vice-President Kücük 
complains to the Security Council that the Greek Cypriots had ceased to show any 
human integrity towards the Turkish Cypriots. Kücük explains how the Greek 
Cypriot Government forces prevented the UN soldiers from collecting the dead 
Turks from the fighting areas so that the bodies could be properly buried. To him 
this goes to show how the Greek Cypriots no longer have ‘even an iota of 
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humanity’.124 The Greek Cypriot Government is also accused of restricting the 
distribution of emergency supplies and food stock to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. 
The Turkish Cypriots see this as a conscious plan to condemn the Turkish 
population into starvation. The Government defends itself by claiming that there are 
no refugees in Cyprus and consequently, no need for emergency supplies. The Greek 
Cypriots argue that by introducing ‘refugee psychology’ to the Turkish Cypriot 
population, the Turkish leaders are trying to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from 
returning to their homes from the enclaves. According to the Cypriot Government, 
the Turkish Cypriots would be free to purchase supplies from the Greek shops, but 
the Turkish extremists are inhibiting that. The Cypriot Government claims that the 
Turkish rebels have already a plenty of stockpiled food and supplies in their own 
deposit, and if the Government would let any more supplies to the island, they would 
inevitably end in the hands of the Turkish terrorists. The main argument of the 
Greek Cypriots is that if the Turkish Cypriots starve, they starve because of the 
Turkish terrorists.125   
 
The United Nations report subsequently mentions that the claim about Turkish 
Cypriots’ stockpiled foodstuff and materials was false.126 The Cypriot Government 
appear to be creating a narrative, in which their actions against the Turkish Cypriot 
population are not motivated by their domestic aspirations, but merely by the need 
to protect the nation against an infiltrated enemy. It is possible that the Cypriot 
Government trusts that the UN could not deny a country’s right to defend itself. For 
finding support in the UN, it was crucial for the Cypriot government to assure that 
the Cypriot Government forces are acting on a legal basis. The next chapter 
examines legal dispute of the crisis and the minority-majority theses of the 
conflicting sides.   
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IV ANALYSIS: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING RIGHTEOUS 
 
4.1 Who has the law on their side?  
 
In September 1964 the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President Kücük describes the 
situation of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus as follows: ‘Nowhere in the world in this 
advanced stage of civilization can human beings be expected to agree to live without 
the protection of the rule of law and deprived of constitutional guarantees, being 
subjected to persecution or receiving the benevolence of a dictator according to his 
whims and caprices..’ 127  
 
As stated in the Chapter 3.1, an ethnocentric identity construction requires its own 
deep history, i.e. a history where the nation and ethnic community have always 
existed. However, the need for a homogenous history and homogenous identity 
becomes problematic when it encounters other nationalist groups.  Deep histories 
offer no explanations on how another ethnic group can rightfully inhabit the same 
national space as one’s own group. It is in contradiction with the paradigm of a 
completely ethnocentric nation. This type of ethnocentric nationalism was typical in 
the 20th century Europe, where the nations were relatively homogenous. However, 
when the Cypriot communities adopted the nationalist sentiments from their 
motherlands, they soon found themselves in a situation where the members of the 
other ethnic groups existed in the same area and would not consent to suppression. 
128 
 
In the Cypriot crisis negotiations, the positions of the two communities were 
determined from the beginning as the state-controlling ethnic group, the Greek 
Cypriots, and the substrate ethnic group, the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots 
strived for the nationalist idea of the sovereign state, which was free to unite with 
its motherland. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, defended their cause as a 
minority group’s right to self-determination and protection. 129  
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The question of the rule of law become crucial in 1964 because it determinates 
whether the Greek Cypriot Government has the legitimacy of a government in the 
eyes of the world or not. The UN may send their peacekeeping forces to a country 
only by the consent of its government. Consequently, creating the UNFICYP in March 
1964 had given recognition to the President Makarios’ Government, even though the 
Turkish Cypriot Ministers had ceased to attend their Cabinet posts. The Resolution 
186 did not acknowledge any other authority than the Government in Cyprus, the 
Turkish Cypriot fighting forces could not have other status than rebels in the island. 
The wording of the Resolution 186 disappointed the Turkish Cypriots, because they 
felt like their actions were not rebellion against the state but against the Greek 
Cypriot assumption that they were rebels. The Turkish Cypriot and Turkey never 
acknowledged the legality of the Cypriot Government.  The Greek Cypriots on the 
other hand expected the UNFICYP to help them to eliminate the Turkish fighting 
forces in the island and were consequently disappointed when it did not do so.130  
 
The Greek Cypriots: The 1960 Constitution is no longer binding 
 
One of the main questions in the historical narrative of the Cypriot crisis is whether 
to consider it a domestic problem or an international one. The choice of perspective 
affects the way the UN are compelled to react in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot 
representatives are eager to assure the Security Council that the dispute is purely 
domestic in nature. On the other hand, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are 
constantly reminding the UN that the Cypriot Constitution provides certain 
guarantees, which add an international aspect to the crisis.   
 
If the UN agree that the dispute is purely a domestic one, the Cypriot Government’s 
claim on the state sovereignty and integrity would guarantee its impunity in the UN. 
With the verbal support of the USSR, the Greek Cypriots link the recent events in 
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Cyprus to the continuum of the smaller states that are pressured in their domestic 
issues by their more powerful neighboring States.131  
 
Before the incidents started in December 1963, the Greek Cypriot President 
Makarios presented his ‘13 Points’ plan to amend the Cypriote Constitution. It was 
mainly directed towards amending the provisions in the Constitution that 
guaranteed the right of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots 
rejected the plan but Makarios’ proposals left the Constitution open for negotiations. 
The Turkish Cypriots consider their position extremely vulnerable and feel like the 
proposed amendments are a direct threat to the existence of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. The Turkish Cypriots are concerned that the Constitution is the only 
thing protecting it against the Greek Cypriots’ autocracy.132  
 
The Greek Cypriote representative Zenon Rossides states to the Security Council 
that even though all of the Makarios 13 amendments would have been implemented 
in 1963, the ‘overprivileges’ of the Turkish Cypriots would still remain ‘(…) far in 
excess of the rights enjoyed by any other minority in any part of the world.’ 133 The 
Greek Cypriots argue that it was the disproportioned rights of the Turkish Cypriots, 
which handicapped the Cypriot Republic and its Constitution. According to the 
Greek Cypriots, the divisive nature of the 1960 Constitution caused only antagonism 
and friction in Cyprus, which in turn led to the recent incidents. They continue to 
argue that the reason why the Turkish Cypriots are so unwilling to accept any 
amendments to the Constitution is not for the sake of their minority rights, but to 
maintain the divisive provisions and to eventually obtain partition.134  
 
Another reason for the Greek Cypriot eagerness to reform the Constitution is the 
Treaty of Guarantee. In its fourth article the Great Britain, Turkey and Greece had 
pledged to protect the 1960 Republic and, if necessary, re-establish the state of 
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affairs created by the Treaty. In other words, the three Guaranteeing Powers were 
allowed to intervene in Cyprus if the Constitution was breached. One of the few US 
statements regarding Cyprus in the Security Council was to remark that regardless 
of the wording of the Article IV, the Treaty itself does not threaten the independence 
or sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, as it simply provides to protect the 
constitutional order. 135 However, to the Greek Cypriots, the Article IV in the Treaty 
of Guarantee possessed a threat of Turkey intervening in Cyprus in order to protect 
the Turkish Cypriots. That would practically also lead to the unwanted outcome of 
partition.  
 
Only way to get rid of the Article IV was to conclude that the whole Treaty of 
Guarantee was no longer binding Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots did so by arguing in 
April 1964 that Turkey had breached the Treaty by moving its contingent outside of 
its designated camp. Thus, the Cypriot Government no longer sees itself bound by 
the Treaty and regards that the existence of the Turkish troops in Cyprus is a 
violation of the principle of state sovereignty. 136 Turkey responds that it would 
move its contingent back to its original camp as soon as the constitutional order was 
restored and the security of the Turkish troops in Cyprus could be ensured. In 
Turkey’s opinion, relocating its contingent for security reasons does not constitute 
a breach in the Treaty of Guarantee. 137 The Turkish Cypriots remind the Security 
Council that the Treaty of Guarantee is one of the basic articles of the Constitution 
and cannot be amended without consultation with the Turkish Cypriots. 138 The 
1960 Constitution requires that each communal group must approve amendments 
to the Constitution and provides that the Basic Articles, including the Treaty of 
Guarantee, cannot be amended at all.139  
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The USSR representative comes to the Greek Cypriots support and questions 
whether the whole 1960 Constitution was based on an ultimatum because no 
Cypriot leaders were heard in its drafting. According to the USSR, Cyprus could not 
be blamed if it wished to amend such an oppressing and divisive Constitution, which 
was imposed on it by force in 1960. This is one of the reasons why the Constitution 
was theoretically open to amendments: it was negotiated under a colonial regime.140 
Regardless of the USSR support, the situation is difficult for the Greek Cypriots: their 
attempts to amend the Constitution is hindered by the Constitution itself. When they 
declare that the Treaty of Guarantee and consequently the whole Constitution no 
longer bind Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots have a strong legal counterargument that 
the Greek Cypriots possess no authority to decide on the matter.   
 
The Turkish Cypriots: Unconstitutional treatment and economic plight 
 
The Turkish Cypriot representative and the President of the Turkish Cypriot 
Communal Chamber Rauf Denktas expresses clearly what he considers to be the 
background of the problem. According to him, the conflict had arisen because the 
Greek Cypriots cannot stop striving for Enosis; President Makarios does not respect 
the 1960 Constitution and had always intended to change it. The Turkish Cypriots 
had, according to Denktas, understood already in 1955 that opposition and 
resistance was inevitable if the Turkish Cypriot community wished to survive in 
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot quest for partition was a response to the Greek Cypriot 
nationalism. The road towards the 1960 independence was paved with violence and 
mistrust, but the Constitution represents the outcome of a sincere attempt to find a 
peaceful solution to the crisis. It was a compromise settlement between two equals 
based on a notion that the Turkish Cypriots are not a minority but a separate 
community. Denktas argues that the notion of minority and majority had not 
prevailed during the drafting of the Constitution in Zürich and London talks because 
‘there had never been a Cypriot nation.’ 141 Denktas reminds the Security Council that 
that the Republic of Cyprus was based on the mutual agreement between Greeks 
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and Turks. According to Denktas, Rossides’ minority-majority thesis has no 
historical substance. 142 
 
To the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot argument that they are an equal 
community in Cyprus creates a concept of separateness, which should not be 
endorsed in the UN.  According to the Greek Cypriot representative Rossides, such a 
claim cannot find a place in the history or in the United Nations because ‘the people 
of every individual country form one unit’. He calls upon the Security Council to help 
the Greek Cypriots to erase the extremism from Cyprus for the sake of integrated 
and undivided people. Rossides concludes, that such is the spirit of their time and 
age. 143  
 
The Turkish Cypriot Vice-President writes to the Security Council also about the 
economic plight, which the Greek Cypriot Government has imposed upon the 
Turkish Cypriots. Since December 1963 the Turkish Cypriot civil servants have not 
received their salaries and the fighting has seriously hindered the work of the 
Turkish Cypriot farmers, who cannot attend or harvest their crop for the fear of their 
lives. The Vice-President also reports that the Government has ceased to pay 
pensions and other social benefits to the Turkish Cypriots, causing them to rely on 
emergency supplies.144 In his response, Zenon Rossides, the representative of 
Cyprus, argues that those civil servants who do not show up at work cannot be 
expected to be paid salaries. According to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots 
Cabinet ministers intentionally withdrew from the Government in order to prevent 
it functioning properly, because then they can argue that the Government has no 
legitimacy. He adds that to pay social benefits to the Turks who support the rebellion 
against their Government is an illogical and unconstitutional idea. He also implies 
that supporting the Turkish Cypriots economically is and has been a burden to the 
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Greek Cypriots. He accuses the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community for 
showing indifference towards the economic life of the country as a whole.145   
 
The Turkish Cypriot response is that the Turkish Cypriote ministers withdrew from 
the Government because it was impossible for them to get to their offices while the 
Greek Cypriots threatened their lives. He denies that the move was intentional and 
targeted against the function of the Government. The Turkish representative 
questions ironically if the representative of Cyprus thinks that the besieged Turkish 
Cypriot civilian women and children in the island have also ‘withdrawn from the 
society.’ 146 The report from the UN Secretary General in September 1964 estimates 
that the Turkish Cypriot civil servants did not withdrew from the Government as 
such, but were unwilling to attend their offices in the Greek Cypriot sides of Cyprus 
for safety reasons. The Turkish Cypriot civil servants affirmed that regardless their 
physical absence, they were willing to do their work in co-ordination with the 
Government and thus expected their salaries to be paid. 147  
 
Why legitimacy matters?  
 
The dispute about the divisive elements and the validity of the Constitution reveals 
many aspects of the national history perceptions. First, it creates a paradox between 
an ethnocentric nation and another ethnic group rightfully inhabiting the same 
national space. The Greek Cypriots cannot accept a Constitution that firstly provides 
extensive rights to the Turkish Cypriots and secondly ratifies their position as not a 
minority group but an equal community in Cyprus. In a nationalist narrative it is 
impossible that two separate and equal ethnic communities would inhabit the same 
national space. Only way to mold the Turkish element into the Cypriot national 
narrative is to cling on the argument that they are a minority group. Questioning the 
Turkish Cypriots’ economic value in the island goes to serve the same purpose and 
implies how the Turkish Cypriots have always been dependent on the Greek 
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Cypriots’ support. Also accusing the Turkish Cypriots ministers from withdrawing 
from the Government creates an impression that the Turkish Cypriots do not care 
about the functioning of the Cypriot nation, but merely look out for their own 
privileged position.   
 
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots show their own nationalist ambitions when 
they refuse to negotiate the Constitution and even consider amending some of their 
rights, even though the realization of their objectives looks less and less likely as the 
crisis prolongs. The Greek Cypriots claim that the Turkish Cypriots are 
uncompromising because they do not sincerely want the Republic of Cyprus to 
work. The two sides’ main narratives are exclusive towards one another: if the 
Turkish Cypriots were as law-abiding and helpless as they expressed to the Security 
Council, there would not be as many conflicts with the Government forces. It can be 
argued that the Turkish Cypriots calculate that hanging on the Constitution and not 
accepting the Greek Cypriot Government is a way to justify their armed fighting in 
Cyprus. On the other hand, one can argue that if the Greek Cypriots were merely 
defending themselves against an armed rebellion, they would not have to so actively 
remind the Security Council about the legality of their cause.  
 
Consequently, the legal dispute does not reach a solution in 1964 but it is used by 
both sides as an instrument to justify their actions. The Greek Cypriots maintain that 
the Cypriot Government is legal and that the Turkish Cypriots have no other status 
than that of rebels, whereas the Turkish Cypriots keep questioning the 
Governments’ legality. The Turkish Cypriots can subsequently enforce a narrative, 
where they are suppressed by a violent aggressor who has no legitimacy of a 
Government and therefore no right to practice violence over them.  The Turkish 
Cypriot community disagreed with the idea that the Constitution had handicapped 
the Republic. According to them, if the Greek Cypriots had only tried to implement 
to Constitution in sincerity and accepted the parts of the Constitution that respected 
Turkish Cypriots’ communal rights, there would have been no problems. The 
Turkish Cypriots saw the Constitution as the backbone of the existence of the 
Cypriot state and any amendments to it would serve merely to crumble these basic 
foundations. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots considered the Constitution to 
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be an instrument coming from the people to serve the people, and therefore to 
propose amendments to it was a legitimate act. 148 
 
Given how high the tensions were that year, it is surprising that it was not until June 
18th, when Turkey declares in the Security Council that there is civil war in Cyprus. 
Turkey demands that the Greek Cypriot sector should not be allowed to hide behind 
the title of the Government and not be recognized as the lawful government of the 
island.149 The Greek Cypriot government maintains its position and claims that 
instead of a civil war, the crisis is still about security forces fighting an armed 
rebellion. According to them, the rebellion is controlled from Ankara and that shows 
how Turkey has no respect for the United Nations nor has it adapted to the spirit of 
the 20th century. 150 Turkey’s statements form a crucial part of the analyzed 
correspondence and the last subchapter of the analysis focuses more on Turkey and 
Greece and their position in the crisis. It also addresses the nationalist ideas that the 
Cypriot communities inherited from their motherlands and which arguably 
inflamed the situation in 1964.  
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4.2 Accusing the ethnic character  
 
‘The trouble in Cyprus (…) is not the result of any inherent communal enmity, which 
never existed, but is an artificially created strife imported from Turkey and whipped 
up by its extremists agents in Cyprus.’151   
 
A nationalist history needs an antagonist to exempt the nation itself from 
responsibility of historical wrongdoings. Nationalist deep histories link the current 
enmity with select past events to create a coherent nationalist story.  The current 
enemy becomes an age-old enemy, with whom the conflict has prevailed over 
generations and generations. The nature of history changes and becomes distorted 
when the current events are seen as a continuum of hundreds of years. The conflict 
becomes an eternalized and a sacred national quest and the current enemy becomes 
the eternalized national antagonist. If this deep history is internalized in the society, 
the antagonism and rivalry may become a part of the community’s national 
identity.152  
 
The Greek Cypriots’ and Turkish Cypriots’ perceptions of when and how the history 
of Cyprus begins vary fundamentally. Their versions of Cypriot history follow their 
motherlands’ national histories. It has been argued, that wherein the Greek Cypriot 
history asserts importance on primordial blood ties, the Turkish Cypriots 
emphasize historical contingency and social constructions. 153 The Greek Cypriot 
historiographies assimilate the beginning of the history of Cyprus with the arrival of 
the ancient Greeks. In the Greek Cypriot mental construction, Cyprus is originally a 
Hellenic island and a part of the Hellenic world. Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative 
ignores the other possible historical versions and the island’s subjection to many 
foreign rulers. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot historiography marks the 
arrival of the Ottomans in 1571 as the first historical period in the island’s history. 
The Turkish Cypriots argue that they share the right to the history in Cyprus equally 
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with the Greek Cypriots, because of the hundreds of years of residence, legacy and 
remains of the Ottoman Era, the longest continuous administration in the island. 154  
 
Historically Greece and the Ottoman Empire had configured their nationalism in the 
physical rivalry with each other. In the late 20th century, when their nationalist ideas 
were exported and adapted among the Cypriots. The Cypriote communities 
formulated their own form of hostile nationalism on the basis of Greece and 
Turkey’s rivalry. The Cypriots cultivated and internalized the exported nationalist 
ideas.  Even though the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had lived side by side for 
hundreds of years, the growth of nationalism made them perceive their old 
neighbors as possible enemies. The suspicion in turn led to strong identification and 
aligning with one’s own ethnic group against the other. Nationalism also tends to 
disregard and suppress the similar features that one has in common with the other 
group. 155 It is argued, that herein lies the historical root of the Cypriot problem: by 
the time of independence in 1960, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were 
unable to recognize that Cyprus was a society with two ethnic groups, instead of one 
homogenous group threatened by an intruder. 156 It is possible, that the rise of 
nationalism in Cyprus prevented the two Cypriot communities from properly 
developing a shared and independent Cypriot identity and made them identify 
themselves merely with their motherlands, rather than building an independent 
state of Cyprus together.  
 
The violence in 1964 increased the tension between the motherlands. Not long after 
the outbreak of the violence Greece accused the Turkish Government for retaliating 
against the Greek citizens in Turkey and its Greek minority. 157 In March 1964, the 
Greek Cypriot representative Zenon Rossides forwards two letters to the Security 
Council. The letters are signed by Dr. Ihsam Ali, who, according to Rossides, is a 
prominent Turkish Cypriot political figure representing the views of the moderate 
Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus. In these letters Dr. Ihsam appeals to the Turkish 
Prime Minister Mr. Inonu to show the same statesmanship in the Cyprus question 
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that kept Turkey away from the World War II. Dr. Ihsam openly condemns the 
Turkish extremists, who by pursuing partition had provoked the violence and terror 
in the island, and who are now trying to lead Turkey to ‘adventures that will 
ultimately precipitate the Third World War.’ 158 The Turkish representative responds 
and questions Dr. Ihsam’s credibility by claiming that there is no information about 
his meetings or conversations with the members of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
Dr. Ihsam’s true political prominence remains unclear. 159 Regardless of the true 
identity of Dr. Ihsam, the letters reveal that the Cypriot Government believes, or at 
least threatens, that Turkey risks international war if it intervenes in Cyprus.  
Regarding the power politics of that time, it could be assumed that Cypriot 
Government trusted that the USSR would not consent to sit back if Turkey, a NATO 
country, invaded Cyprus. Following the domino effect of the cold war tensions, the 
US would then be forced to take action against the USSR.  
 
As the crisis escalated, the diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey 
deteriorated to a breaking point. Both Turkey and Greece begin to refer to their past 
rivalry in their letters to the Security Council. In May 1964 the Turkish 
representative accuses Greece of encouraging the Greek Cypriot leaders to pursue 
Enosis. He claims that Enosis in Cyprus would serve Greece’s age-old idea of 
Hellenism and territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey. In the same letter the 
Turkish representative blames Greece for trying to add an element of religious 
antagonism in the narrative by accusing Turkey of persecuting the Orthodox Greeks 
in Turkey. In response, Turkey accuses Greece of trying to turn the Christian world 
against it. 160 Turkey denies all implications that the crisis has a religious aspect and 
reminds the Security Council that it has always been tolerant towards religious 
freedom. 161 It could be speculated that maintaining a reputation of a tolerant, 
modern country in the Security Council was especially important to Turkey as it 
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wished to convince the UN that its actions in Cyprus were not based on aggression 
or imperialist motives.  
 
Turkey also accuses Greece of supporting the Cypriot Government forces. After the 
outset of the fighting many Greek volunteers had indeed arrived in Cyprus and by 
July 1964 an estimated 3000 Greek soldiers and volunteers had joined the Cypriot 
Government forces.162 Greece’s response is quick: it denies that it wants anything 
else but an independent Cyprus freed from external influence or pressure. Greece 
wishes to see Cyprus with a Greek Cypriot majority, which is capable to govern its 
own country and a Turkish Cypriot minority, which has certain protected rights. And 
if Cyprus wants Enosis, it should be free to decide that for itself. 163  
 
Apart from blaming the other side for acting immorally and counterproductively, 
the conflicting sides have also different opinions on what caused the friction 
between the two communities in Cyprus, who, despite of the traditional rivalry of 
their motherlands, had successfully inhabited the same island for hundreds of years 
without conflicts or fighting. Galo Plaza, the UN Mediator in Cyprus also noted this 
in his report to the Secretary General when he remarks how the emotions of national 
honor and pride arise from the ethnic ties between Greece and the Greek Cypriots 
and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Each of the communities in Cyprus values its 
motherland’s ethnic and national traditions. However, Plaza proceeds, in normal 
times these distinctive features have not prevented the two Cypriot communities 
from living side by.164  
 
However, something did cause the ethnic and traditional friction to flame up 
violently in 1964. It is argued that the end of the British colonial administration 
forced the two communities to confront each other directly for the first time. Cyprus 
was granted independence without prior form of self-government, which meant 
that it had to establish all administrative structures and local governance from 
scratch. Both Cypriot communities become frustrated in the process, which 
                                                        
162 Report by the Secretary General. 10 September 1964. S/5950. Paragraphs 20-22. Pages 8-9.  
163 Letter from the permanent representative of Greece to the Secretary General. 15 May 1964. 
S/5702. 2.  
164 Report by Galo Plaza to the Secretary General. March 26, 1965. Paragraphs 18, 20, 162.    
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eventually may have led to the violent incidents. 165 The Greek Cypriot version does 
not support this theory. For them, the main culprit for the violence is found in the 
alleged Turkish extremists and terrorists who have infiltrated in the island. They are 
careful not to assert the blame on the civilian Turkish Cypriot population, but to 
always blame the terrorist elements. The Greek Cypriot representative writes in 
March 1964 that even though the Turks invaded Cyprus with aggression in 1571, 
the Turks who were inhabited in the island during the invasion eventually became 
a part of the Cypriot people and were so treated.166 It could be speculated that by 
insistently blaming Turkey for the crisis, the Greek Cypriots want to emphasize to 
the UN that their actions towards the Turkish Cypriot population are not any form 
of retaliation or persecution against a minority group.  
 
The Greek Cypriots representative’s reference to the Turkish invasion in 1571 also 
works to remind the Security Council how Turkey has a history of aggression 
towards Cyprus.  The Cypriot Government accuses Turkey of threatening it again 
with ‘the 19th century diplomacy of force’ and for sending extremists to Cyprus to 
provoke violence. Therefore, according to Greek Cypriot representative, ‘Turkey 
cannot appear before the UN Security Council in any capacity other than that of the 
accused.’ 167   
 
Later in 1964 the Greek Cypriots’ approach towards the Turkish Government 
becomes slightly softer. The Greek Cypriots express their regret that the ‘extremist 
elements’ in Turkey have driven the Turkish Government to its recent ‘unenviable 
position’ regarding Cyprus.168 Turkey never responds to the comment, even though 
admitting to the Greek Cypriot claim would ease Turkey’s position and exempt it 
from some of the pressure in the UN. However, it would also give the impression 
that Turkey has no control over the matter and secondly Turkey would be forced to 
condemn the actions of the fighting Turkish Cypriots, who it had supported from the 
                                                        
165 Crawshaw. 1978. 364-365.  
166 Letter from the permanent representative of Cyprus to the Security Council. 3 March 1964. S/5573. 
1.  
167 Letter from the permanent representative of Cyprus to the Secretary General. 28 April 1964. 
S/5670. 11.   
168  Letter from the permanent representative of Cyprus to the Security Council. 4 June 1964. S/5742. 
3.   
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beginning. Turkey also denies that it had intentionally sent extremists in Cyprus to 
fight, which can be confirmed by the relatively small number of Turkish fighters 
compared to the volume Greek volunteers in Cyprus.169 However, Turkey’s 
geographical proximity to Cyprus provided that it could send its military to the 
island in a short notice at any time. The Greek Cypriots are offering the Turkish 
Government a possibility to distance itself from the responsibility, but it refuses to 
accept the narrative.  
 
Turkey defenses itself by pointing out that its rights to intervene in Cyprus are not 
inherited from the 19th century but from the 1960 Constitution, which reinforced 
Turkey’s position in Cyprus as a Guaranteeing Power. Turkey repeats the Turkish 
Cypriot claim that the Treaties leading to the Constitution were negotiated 
peacefully and signed without any aggression or threats. The fact that President 
Makarios is now trying to denounce these Treaties is to Turkey a clear sign that it is 
the Cypriot Government who employs questionable diplomacy. The Turkish 
representative also systematically denies all threats to the independence of Cyprus 
and points out that Turkey has done its utmost to find a peaceful solution to the 
crisis.  The basic note behind the letter is that while Turkey has waited for the 
Cypriot Constitution to be respected, the Greek Cypriots have been free to slaughter 
the Turkish Cypriot population. Turkey claims that all the letters from the Greek 
Cypriot representatives to the Security Council, are a mere attempt to cover up the 
actions of the Cypriot Government forces in the island.170 With these statements, 
Turkey assures to the Security Council that it does not act in Cyprus in colonial or 
invasive motivation, nor is it motivated by its Ottoman history or by its traditional 
rivalry with Greece. Perhaps unexpectedly, Greece remains relatively quiet in the 
UN during 1964. It is speculated that it had less control over the Greek Cypriots and 
President Makarios than Turkey had over the Turkish Cypriots. 171  
                                                        
169  See Report by the Secretary General. 10 September 1964. S/5950. Paragraphs 20, 23. Pages 8-9. 
170 Letters from the permanent representative of Turkey to the Security Council. 23 January 1964. 
S/5521. 1. & 6 August 1964. S/5858. 2-3. 
171 Anastasiou. 2011. 93. 117–118. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The thesis set out to answer the following research questions: What kind of history 
of the Cyprus dispute is narrated to the Security Council by the conflict States? Did the 
representatives’ nationalist history perceptions affect their statements? What methods 
and motives of politics of history can be detected from the correspondence? 
 
It is as crucial to the Greek Cypriots to convince the Security Council that the two 
Cypriot communities can live together peacefully as it is crucial to Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriot community to convince the Security Council that the two 
communities cannot live peacefully together. It becomes quite clear in 1964 that 
Turkey had adopted a role as an advocate and a spokesperson for the Turkish 
Cypriot cause in the UN.    
 
In their correspondence towards the UN, the Greek Cypriots clearly emphasize their 
historical connectedness to the Greek world. Arguing that Cyprus is primordially a 
Greek nation narrates a history where Cyprus as an ethnocentric nation is entitled 
to reach Enosis, because that is its destiny. The Security Council is let to believe that 
the road towards unification with Greece would be peaceful, had not the infiltrated 
Turkish radicals caused trouble in the island. The Greek Cypriots maintained 
throughout the 1964 correspondence that the fighting and violence in Cyprus was 
caused by the Turkish extremists. The Greek Cypriots narrate a history to the 
Security Council where the recent fighting has nothing to do with the Greek Cypriot 
Enosis movement.  
 
The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand narrate a history where the Greek Cypriots 
are trying to annihilate the whole Turkish community from Cyprus under the eyes 
of the world.  They argue that their minority identity is endangered by the Enosis 
movement and see no other way to protect it but to demand partition of the island. 
Turkey creates a narrative where the Turkish population has suffered for a long time 
in the hands of the Greek Cypriot EOKA movement and that the incidents in 1964 
are just a continuum of that struggle.  
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The Greek Cypriots claim that the idea of partition should be foreign to a Cypriot 
person. They imply, that the Turkish Cypriots are narrating a tale of Turkish 
Cypriots’ plight to discredit the Greek Cypriots. In 1964 the majority of the Turkish 
Cypriot population was relocated to enclaves with poor conditions. The Turkish 
Cypriots argue that it was because they could not risk living in the mixed villages 
where the Greek Cypriot armed forces were threatening their lives. The Greek 
Cypriots interpreted this to the Security Council that the Turks were implementing 
a self-segregation policy in order to reach partition of the island.  
 
The problem derivers from the incompatibility of the Cypriot narratives. It is the 
majority defending itself against a rebelling minority, versus a smaller community’s 
struggle to survive in a hostile environment, dominated by a bigger community. The 
communities create a complex clash of narratives: a country’s right to sovereignty 
versus minority group’s right to self-determination. That is why it is important to 
the Greek Cypriots to convince the Security Council that the crisis is domestic in 
nature and equally important to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to convince the 
UN that the crisis has an international dimension and to remind the Security Council 
that it has an obligation to help the Turkish Cypriots.  
 
The Turkish Cypriote approached the 1964 negotiations by arguing that the Greek 
Cypriote demand for reinforcing the 1960 Republic was a mere maneuver towards 
unification with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots feared that if the international 
pressure was removed and the Republic of Cyprus was re-established, the Greek 
Cypriots would be free to continue their quest for Enosis and further oppress and 
terrorize the Turkish Cypriots. In the Turkish Cypriot perspective, their fighting was 
an act of self-defense against the Greek Cypriot atrocities, and a partition or a 
federation would be the only solution to protect them in the future. The Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are both trying to achieve legitimacy to their own 
cause by referring to the historical background of the Constitution or presenting 
conflicting views about the minority-majority status of the communities. 
 
What can be concluded from the analysis is that the two Cypriot sides were using 
the politics of history in 1964 to create two completely different narratives about 
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the same conflict. Also the representatives of Greece and Turkey used arguments 
drawn from their historical rivalry. Turkey accuses Greece of expansionism whereas 
Greece claims that Turkey has mistreated its Greek Orthodox civilians as retaliation 
for the events in Cyprus. Their arguments makes it seem that the conflict in Cyprus 
is yet another chapter in the continuum of their enmity. 
 
If we return to Pilvi Torsti’s framework of analyzing the politics of history, we can 
detect some of the outlined methods and motives in the Cypriot correspondence. 
The politics of history in juridical level and the legislative power of history appear 
in the statements about the Cypriot Constitution and the legitimacy of the Greek 
Cypriot Government. The representatives also employ strong expressions 
(‘genocide’ and ‘massacre’) when they explain the other sides’ actions. Herein the 
question of choice becomes emphasized: the representatives could have expressed 
their points in another words as well, but they chose to use expressions that had 
very strong historical associations with them.  
 
When it comes to Torsti’s outline of motives for political use of history, especially 
foreign policy motives and motives based on generally accepted basic values were 
detectable from the correspondence. The representatives emphasized their position 
and connectedness to certain parts of history (Greece, Enosis and Hellenism) while 
disregarding others (years of Ottoman administration). History was also used to 
legitimize policy change when the Greek Cypriots and the USSR argue that the 
Cypriot Constitution is no longer binding because it was negotiated under a colonial 
regime and imposed by an ultimatum on Cyprus.  
 
Motives based on the generally accepted basic values are visible when the Turkish 
Cypriots appeal to the Security Council not to let the massacre of the Turks in Cyprus 
to go down in history as a stain to the free world, as well as when they remind the 
Security Council what happened when they remained impassive when the USSR 
suppressed a Hungarian uprising in Budapest. Turkey uses the same motivation 
when it threatens that it cannot stand aside when the Turkish Cypriots are forced to 
relive the terror they have encountered already during the EOKA fighting in the 
1950s in Cyprus. The USSR also employs ‘universal good’ motives when it threatens 
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that it will not allow Cyprus be a continuum of small states whose state integrity is 
breached by a bullying neighboring state.  
 
What is not very visible in the correspondence is the domestic motives for political 
use of history. However, this can be expected as the Cypriot representatives’ 
communications towards the UN were intended to affect the international opinion 
rather than the domestic one. Should one look into the local Cypriot newspapers and 
publications, it is safe to assume to find examples of the political use of history. That 
would constitute an interesting topic for further research. Another question for 
follow-up research would be to look more carefully into the Cold War tensions in 
the beginning of the Cypriot crisis to see how important role the USSR and the US 
played in the outcome of the negotiations and in the future of the dispute. Both super 
powers remained relatively quiet in the Security Council debates about Cyprus but 
had a strong impact on the conflicting sides in the background,  
 
Many nationalist structures can be detected from the representatives’ statements. 
All sides employ deep histories, either intentionally or unconsciously and the idea 
of an ethnocentric nation inhabited by one ethnic group is visible in Turkey’s and 
the Turkish Cypriots’ demand for partition and in Greek Cypriots’ demand for Enosis. 
The conflicting sides find the national antagonist from the current enemy. The thesis 
proves that theories of nationalism create a substantial extension the politics of 
history research. Especially in a protracted ethnonational conflict such as the Cyprus 
dispute, nationalism and the political use of history are closely intertwined together 
and one cannot, and should not, be examined without understanding the other.  
 
The thesis concludes that the political use of history is often intertwined with the 
nationalist mental constructions: deep histories, the idea of a nation’s ethnocentric 
destiny, as well as the structure of an eternal enemy and continuous struggle. The 
different motivations and methods of political use of history are often interlinked 
and exist at the same time. The framework of the political use of history gives depth 
to the historical analysis, when it seeks to understand the motives behind the 
recollection of historical events.  
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Appendix 2. Location of Cyprus 
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